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 I. INTRODUCTION
Contract law has neither a complete descriptive theory, explaining what the law is, nor a
complete normative theory, explaining what the law should be.  These gaps are unsurprising given
the traditional definition of contract as embracing all promises that the law will enforce.  Even a
theory of contract law that focuses only on the enforcement of bargains must still consider the
entire continuum from standard form contracts between firms and consumers to commercial
contracts between business firms.  No descriptive theory has yet explained a law of contract that
comprehends such a broad domain.  Normative theories that are grounded in a single norm -- such
as autonomy or efficiency -- also have foundered over the heterogeneity of contractual contexts to
which the theory is to apply.1  Pluralist theories attempt to respond to the difficulty that unitary
Rev. 821 (1992).  Efficiency theories tend to have a more limited scope.  Positive articles analyze broad doctrinal
patterns in the attempt to find fundamental consistency between these patterns and the efficiency norm, but the
authors do not purport to provide a fully descriptive theory of contract law.  See, e.g., Charles J. Goetz & Robert E.
Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 Yale L. J. 1261 (1981); Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L. J. 729 (1989). 
Normative economic theories, on the other hand, typically evaluate discrete doctrines by the efficiency norm.  See
e.g., Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle, 77
Colum. L. Rev. 554 (1977); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89 Yale. L. J. 271 (1979); Christine
Jolls, Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification, 26 J. Leg. Stud. 203
(1997); Robert E. Scott, The Case for Market Damages: Revisiting the Lost Profits Puzzle, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 455
(1990).
2 The problems that pluralist theories without meta norms pose are nicely illustrated in Melvin Eisenberg’s
effort, that purports to solve the “broad scope of contract problem” by proposing overlapping sets of norms. See
Melvin A. Eisenberg,, The Bargain Principle and its Limits, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 741 (1982); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The
Theory of Contracts in THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS (Peter Benson ed. 2000).  For
example, Eisenberg’s schema restricts the domain of freedom of contract by norms of reciprocity, trust, and fairness. 
He recognizes that this “multi-value” approach can generate conflicting social propositions.  When conflicts actually
occur, “the lawmaker must make a legal rule that gives a proper weight and role to each of the conflicting values or
goals in the context at hand.”  Further, “when social propositions conflict, the legislature must exercise good
judgment concerning the weight or role to give to each proposition in the issue at hand.”  Eisenberg, The Theory of
Contracts at 243-44.  Eisenberg recognizes that his theory lacks a metric that would tell the lawmaker just how to
give the proper “weight and role” to each social proposition or value when conflicts occur.  Since courts or
legislatures are likely to be involved when the relevant social propositions or values arguably favor more than one
party type or interest group, pluralist theories such as Eisenberg’s tend to be least helpful when they are most needed.
 
3In a thoughtful critique of autonomy and efficiency theories of contract, Michael Trebilcock concludes that
both theory types are “valid in their own right”, but without a “meta-theory that weights and ranks these various
values”, both values should be pursued in various social contexts according to the relative competency of different
legal institutions to perform effectively. See Trebilcock, supra note 1, at 248.  This article takes up Trebilcock’s
invitation and proposes a normative theory that fits business contracts, the subsidiary category of contractual
relationships that the law most affects.
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normative theories pose by urging courts to pursue efficiency, fairness, good faith and the
protection of individual autonomy.  Such theories need, but so far lack, a meta principle that tells
which of these goals should be decisive when they conflict.2 We attempt to make progress here
with a  more modest approach -- to set out and defend a normative theory to guide decisionmakers
in the regulation of business contracts.3 
 The theory’s affirmative claim, in brief, is that contract law should facilitate the efforts of
contracting parties to maximize the joint gains (the “contractual surplus”) from transactions.  The
theory’s negative claim is that contract law should do nothing else.  Both claims follow from the
premise that the state should choose the rules that regulate commercial transactions according to
4the criterion of welfare maximization.
  
A simple categorization of the universe of bargaining transactions will clarify the domain
of our theory. A transaction involves a seller (whether of goods or services) and a buyer.  Parties
to transactions can be partitioned into individuals and firms.  This yields four transactional
categories: (1) A firm sells to another firm; (2) An individual sells to another  individual; (3) A
firm sells to an individual; and (4) An individual sells to a  firm.  Category 2 contracts, between
individuals, are primarily regulated by family law (antenuptial agreements and divorce
settlements) and real property law (home sales and some leases).  Few litigated contracts between
individuals are regulated by the rules of contract law.  Category 3 contracts, between a firm as
seller and an individual as buyer, are primarily regulated by consumer protection law, real
property law (most leases) and the securities laws.  Category 4 contracts, between an individual as
seller and a firm as buyer, commonly involve the sale of a person’s labor, and are regulated by
laws governing the employment relation.  The rules in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
and the provisions of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts constitute what commonly is meant
by contract law.  These provisions are primarily invoked to resolve disputes arising under
Category 1 contracts, between firms.  Our theory applies only to these contracts, and thus has
important implications for the content of the UCC and the common law of contracts.
Category 1 contracts, however, can be partitioned into two subcategories.  Some parties
obviously are sophisticated economic actors (i.e., the General Electric Corporation).  Other parties
function in commercial contexts but have many of the characteristics of ordinary persons(i.e., a
gift shop owned and run by a retired teacher).  Any effort to analyze contracts between “firms”
thus confronts a boundary issue – to define a firm for purposes of the theory.  We draw this
boundary here by defining a Category 1 firm as (a) an entity that is organized in the corporate
form and that has five or more employees; (b) a limited partnership; and (c) a professional
partnership such as a law or accounting firm.  These economic entities apparently understand how
to make business contracts, and the theory we develop here applies only to contracts between two
such firms.  The extent to which this Article’s conclusions hold when one or both of the parties to
a commercial contract falls on the other side of our boundary awaits further work.
4Legal scholars commonly refer to investment in the contract’s subject matter as “reliance”.  We use
reliance and the economist’s term “investment” interchangeably.
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Firms that maximize profits face the canonical “contracting problem” of ensuring both
efficient ex post trade and efficient ex ante investment in the subject matter of the contract.4 
Parties trade efficiently when, and only when, the value of the exchanged performance to the
buyer exceeds the cost of performance to the seller.  Parties invest efficiently when their actions
maximize a deal’s expected surplus.  Many observers would agree that contract law should
attempt to facilitate efficient trade and investment.  The novelty of our theory lies in its systematic
development of the implications of this goal and in its claim that contract law should restrict itself
to the pursuit of efficiency alone (for Category 1 contracts).
Four objections may be made to the claim that contract law should restrict itself to
encouraging efficient trade and investment.  First, one can argue that firms sometimes do not
maximize profits and, owing to the systematic cognitive errors made by the people who run them,
are incapable of doing so should they try. Thus, a law that presupposes profit maximization will
be misguided.  Second, firms that maximize profits sometimes do bad things – pollute the
environment , for example -- that the law should attempt to deter.  Third, the state should promote
fairness in contracting in addition to efficiency.  And, finally, the state should pursue
distributional goals although they sometimes conflict with efficiency.
These objections should trouble a unitary efficiency approach to the regulation of all
contract types, but we will argue that the objections have little force when Category 1 contracts
alone are considered.  Thus, we will argue, firms and markets are structured so as to minimize the
likelihood of systematic cognitive error by important decisionmakers within the firm.  Cognitive
error, that is, is more likely to afflict Category 2 and 3 contracts than Category 1 contracts. 
Further, the bad things that firms do commonly entail imposing costs on third parties, such as
creating environmental harms or erecting barriers to entry.  These behaviors – the creation of
negative externalities – are regulated by the environmental and antitrust laws.  An analysis of
contract law as such therefore can assume the absence of externalities.  Finally, it usually is futile
5As another example of the criticism that we sidestep here, Professor Melvin Eisenberg has criticized
theories holding that contract law should maximize welfare alone on the ground that “these theories are
impoverished ... because they exclude other important policy values, such as the value of keeping intimate and
affective relationships free from the intrusion of state power”.  Melvin A. Eisenberg,The Theory of Contracts,  in
THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 206, 238 (Peter Benson, Ed. 2000).  This objection may
have force as applied to Category 2 contracts, between persons, but seems irrelevant to the Category 1 contracts we
analyze.  Thus, contracts between General Electric and General Motors seem not to involve “intimate and affective
relationships.”
6A relation-specific investment is not fully “redeployable”.  As an example, assume that a seller purchases
standard steel tubes to make a machine for the buyer.  The seller’s investment would be “general” if breach occurred
before the seller began work on the tubes because the tubes could be resold on the market.  The investment would
become “relation specific” if breach occurred after the tubes had been fabricated into shapes that only the buyer
could use; for then the transmuted tubes could only be resold as scrap, probably for less than their cost.
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to pursue contractual fairness when firms are permitted a large measure of contractual freedom. 
This is because firms will contract away from fair legal rules that do not maximize joint surplus. 
In sum, efficiency is the only  institutionally feasible and normatively attractive goal for a contract
law that regulates deals between firms.5 
 An efficiency theory restricted to contracts between firms (as firms are defined above) has
four major implications for contract law.  To understand the first implication, realize that
contracts often would be performed even if there were no legal sanction for breach.  These
contracts are “self-enforcing” in two senses.  First, when parties contemplate making a series of
contracts, neither party would breach an early contract if the gains from one breach are lower than
the expected profit stream from future contracts that breach would cause to vanish.  Second,
neither party will breach if the gains are exceeded by the reputational sanction the market will
exact.  When contracts fall outside the self-enforcing range, legal enforcement is necessary to
ensure performance in two principal cases: in volatile markets, when a party’s failure to perform
could threaten its contract partner’s survival; and when contractual surplus would be maximized if
one or both parties made relation-specific investments.6  “Enforcement” includes more than
simply requiring parties to perform, however.  The enforcement function comprises policing
contracts for fraud and duress, and the congeries of rules that encourage or facilitate performance,
such as the damage rules.  Perhaps a third of the sections in UCC Article 2 are enforcement rules
under the definition here.  The initial implication of our theory is that enforcement, when needed,
is much the most important thing the state does.  Put more starkly, a modern commercial economy
7A “hard” parol evidence rule treats writings that appear to be complete contracts as complete contracts. 
See TAN 81-89, infra.
8The decisionmaker specifies the content of a rule in advance.  Thus, drivers cannot exceed a 55 mile per
hour speed limit.  The decisionmaker specifies the content of a standard ex post.  Thus, parties must drive
“reasonably” in the circumstances.
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can function well with little more than honest courts and a set of enforcement rules.  The rest is of
second-order importance.
A court cannot enforce contracts, however, without a theory of interpretation that “maps”
from the syntactic content of the parties’ writing to the writing’s legal implications.  An
interpretive theory that is grounded in efficiency holds, in contrast to the UCC and much modern
scholarship, that textualist interpretations best suit parties to Category 1 contracts.  Business
firms, that is, prefer courts to adhere as closely as is possible to the ordinary meanings of the
words the parties used, apply a “hard” parol evidence rule,7  and honor “merger clauses” reciting
that the parties intended their writing to be interpreted as if it were complete.  A textualist theory
of interpretation, however, will not suit all parties all of the time.  Therefore, our second
implication actually holds that textualist interpretation should be the default theory for Category 1
contracts.  Courts should use narrow evidentiary bases when interpreting agreements between
firms, but also should comply with party requests to broaden the base that is applicable to them. 
This implication is at variance with current law, which holds that interpretation is an issue for
courts to decide and is conducted according to rules that parties cannot vary.
Contract law has more rules than are needed to perform the enforcement and interpretation
functions.  These rules, that regulate various aspects of the contracting relationship, commonly are
defaults, controlling only when parties do not contract out.  Creating good defaults is widely
believed to be the principal function of a law of contracts.  This belief is misguided because the
state could create defaults that business firms would want only under quite stringent conditions. 
A good default rule8 must apply in very few possible states of the world, be relatively simple in
form, be efficient in a highly heterogenous set of circumstances, and not rely on information that
courts cannot conveniently recover.  A default standard should be written when parties do not
8need, or it is too costly to provide them with, concrete guidance regarding the performance
obligation.  Because standards permit parties much latitude (the seller must deliver in a
“reasonable” time), a good standard will confer discretion only when a party’s likely actions
under it will maximize joint rather than individual gains.  Statutory drafters and courts, we will
argue, often adopt default rules and standards that fail to satisfy these stringent conditions.  This is
itself inefficient because parties respond to bad rules or standards by contracting out of them.  The
creation of inefficient defaults thus raises business parties’ contracting costs but does not
otherwise affect their behavior.  Our theory’s third implication holds, in consequence, that the
effective domain of business contract law is much smaller than is commonly thought.  Another
way to put this point is that the difficulty of creating good defaults makes much of what today is
called contract law irrelevant to commercial life.
In addition to the many defaults, contract law contains a number of mandatory rules that
are applied to contracts between firms as well as to contracts between firms and persons.  The
fourth implication of our efficiency theory is that many of the rules regulating business contracts
should not be mandatory.  We discuss a number of mandatory rules, including the interpretation
rules, the modification rules and the rules relating to liquidated damage clauses.  The justification
for these rules apparently is a form of paternalism.  The contract terms the rules override do not
create externalities and are not unconscionable.  Rather, contract law overrides terms that appear
to decision makers to conflict with the parties true substantive intentions.  We argue, to the
contrary, that business firms have good reasons to adopt the terms that today are prohibited, and
that a commitment to party sovereignty requires those reasons to be respected.
   
There are several reasons why an attempt to develop a general efficiency theory of
business contracts is particularly salient now.  First, the specification of a good contract law has
become an important priority in many countries as they have made a commitment to markets.  It
is a consensus that a good contract law is a necessary condition for a modern commercial
economy.  It is less well understood just how such a law is supposed to function.  Our article thus
attempts to address  concerns that have global implications.
9The work of these scholars is concisely summarized in Karl-Gustaf Lofgren, Torsten Perssons and Jorgen
Weibull, Markets with Asymmetric Information: The Contributions of George Akerlof, Michael Spence and Joseph
Stiglitz, 104 Scan. J. Econ. 195 (2002).
10Law and economics scholars such as Aaron Edlin, Ian Ayres and Jason Johnston have used contract
theory in illuminating fashion when discussing particular legal rules.  See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L. J. 729 (1989);  Jason Johnston,
Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 Yale L. J. 615 (1990).  Aaron Edlin,
Cadillac Contracts and Upfront Payments: Efficient Investment Under Expectation Damages, 12 J. L. Econ. & Org.
98  (1996).  The genre of model that we and these scholars use has performed well in empirical tests.  See P. A.
Chiappori and B. Salanie, Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Empirical Work, Working Paper
#2002-11, Institut National De La Statistique Et Des Etudes Economiques (2002).
11GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
12“The theory of contract, as formulated by Holmes and Williston, seems to have gone into its protracted
period of breakdown almost from the moment of its birth” Id. at 57. But see, Richard E. Speidel, An Essay on the
Reported Death and Continued Vitality of Contract, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 (1975).
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A further reason motivating our decision to develop a theory of business contracts is that
the building blocks for such a theory are only now becoming available.  Contract theory has
become one of the most significant fields in modern micro and industrial organization economics.
Three recent Nobel prizes, to George Akerloff, Michael Spence and Joseph Stiglitz, were awarded
largely for work in contract theory, but the field itself is less than thirty years old.9  Moreover,
much of the work in the field takes a mathematical form, and thus has not been easily accessible
to nonspecialists.  We draw heavily on contract theory to construct our normative theory of
contracts.10
Finally, as we suggested earlier, the current state of contract law scholarship suffers from
the absence of a successful theory of contract.   Thirty years ago, Grant Gilmore described what
he called the classic Willistonian model of contract law, a model grounded in formalist notions of
the centrality of written agreements voluntarily exchanged between contracting parties, and that
emphasized the limited role of the law in enforcing and interpreting these agreements.11 
According to Gilmore, this classical model owed more to Holmes’ imagination than to a careful
reading of the case law.12  But whether this was so or not, Gilmore believed that the modern case
law repudiated the model.  The disjunction between the dominant scholarly view and the lived
13“Consider the Restatement’s definition of consideration [in §75] taken in connection with its most
celebrated section, § 90 (promissory estoppel)...One thing that is clear is that these two contradictory propositions
cannot live comfortably together: in the end one must swallow the other up.”  Id. at 60-61.
14Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law after Three Decades: Success or Failure?  Yale
L.J.(2002).
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doctrine, he thought, produced incoherence.13  Modern scholars commonly share Gilmore’s
rejection of Williston but have yet to disprove his incoherence thesis.14   We, too, lack a theory of
everything.  Rather, the theory we develop here is Willistonian in spirit, but applies in a limited
domain -- to contracts between firms that do not create externalities. 
This limited scope permits our normative thesis to develop according to a particular logic. 
The market’s social function is to maximize welfare, subject to distributional and fairness
constraints.  Firms, we show below, have incentives to choose the contracts and contracting
strategies that will maximize the surplus their deals can create.  Further, firms are more able than
courts or statutory drafters at choosing efficient terms and strategies.  It follows that, when
externalities are absent, a contract law that regulates firms should be the contract law that firms
prefer.  The state, that is, should let the preferences of firms control because firms can better
pursue the objective that both the state and firms share.  The central organizing question this
Article asks thus is: What contract law would commercial parties want the state to provide?
We proceed as follows.  Part II defends the welfare maximization norm as applied to the
contracts of sophisticated actors.  In Part III, we describe commercial parties’ first order
preference: To have the state enforce contracts in order to protect relation-specific investments or
to guard against especially disruptive market movements.  Part IV argues that firms want the state
to supply a theory of interpretation, but not the theory currently advanced by the UCC and the
Restatement of Contracts.  Rather, we defend a textualist theory of interpretation as the optimal
default approach for business contracts.   In Part V, we develop the restrictive conditions under
which the state can create defaults terms that satisfy typical party preferences.  Part VI analyzes a
set of unjustifiable mandatory rules -- rules that rest on a misplaced view of the parties’ interests.
We conclude, in Part VII, that today’s contract law is a series of category mistakes.  Rules that are
15Vestiges of this distinction exist in the few Uniform Commercial Code sections that regulate deals
“between merchants” differently than deals between a merchant and a person.  See, e.g., UCC §§ 2-104(3), 2-201(2),
2-207(2), 2-209(2), 2-603, and 2-609(2). 
16Individuals are assumed to be risk averse while firms are assumed to be risk neutral.  The utility function
of a  risk neutral party is linear in money: that is, the party values each additional dollar of wealth it may receive as
much as it valued all previous dollars.  Because monetary gains are coextensive with utility gains for risk neutral
parties, we assume that firms maximize profits, a monetary measure.
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appropriate for contracts involving individuals (Categories 2 through 4 above) are too frequently
applied today within the domain in which sophisticated parties function.  Another way to put this
conclusion is to remark that commercial law for centuries has drawn a distinction between
mercantile contracts and others.15  Modern scholars have not systematically pursued the normative
implications of this ancient distinction, however.  We attempt to cure this neglect by setting out
the theoretical foundations of a law merchant for our time
II. JUSTIFYING AN EFFICIENCY THEORY OF CONTRACT
A. What Firms Maximize
It had been traditional to assume that firms attempt to maximize expected profits.  The
accuracy of this assumption recently has been challenged.  An economic actor may not maximize
wealth16 for two reasons: (a) She is maximizing something other than her own wealth, perhaps
because she is concerned with fairness; (b) She cannot maximize wealth in the context under
study, perhaps because she is prone to cognitive error.  These reasons apply much less to firms
than to persons.  A firm is directed by its owners, who often are shareholders.  Shareholders
prefer their firms to maximize profits that the shareholders then can consume or save.  Firms thus
will choose to maximize profits unless the managers who run them cannot be controlled by the
shareholders who own them.  In these cases, the managers may be maximizing their own earnings
or perks at the expense of profit maximization.  
No one doubts that managers sometimes successfully sabotage owners, but for two
reasons we will assume here that managers obey shareholder instructions.  First, managers
17In addition, many corporate executives have attended business school and also attend business school
executive programs for working managers.  It is a function of business education to teach people to make optimizing
(rather than cognitively erroneous) decisions.
18Psychologists and economists have shown that persons make systematic cognitive mistakes in laboratory
experiments when asked to solve specified individual decision problems.  These experiments do not test a general
theory of how people make decisions, and thus they raise an issue of external validity: it is an open question whether,
or when, real world parties will behave as did the experimental subjects.  Two scholars recently noted a consequence
of this “lack of theoretical foundations”: “the policy implications of BE [behavioral economics] are limited by its
inability to predict circumstances in which anomalous behavior will arise (other than in those sorts of circumstances
in which it has been observed before) or how it will respond to policy changes”.  Jessica L. Cohen and William T.
Dickens, A Foundation for Behavioral Economics 92 Amer. Econ. Rev. 335 (2002).  For recent, exhaustive analyses
of the psychological literature and a skeptical view of its relevance for the law see Gregory Mitchell, Taking
Behavioralism Too Seriously?  The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavorial Analysis of Law, 43 William and
Mary L. Rev. 1907 (2002); Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not be Traded
for Behavioral Law and Economics Equal Incompetency, 91 Geo. L. J. ___ (2002).  
We provisionally view the individual decision experiments as not relevant to our project for three reasons. 
First, as we are in a world of speculation, we speculate that individuals in laboratories may perform worse than
officers of firms because the experimental subjects had not been trained to make good decisions and were not subject
12
sabotage shareholders either by diverting corporate wealth to themselves or by failing to take
appropriate risks on behalf of the firm.  Managers, however, have no incentive to degrade the
quality of the contracts that they do write; after all, these contracts create the wealth that the
managers later can divert.  Second, the legal rules that attempt to deter bad manager behavior fall
in the domains of the criminal, corporate and securities laws.  Contract law should exploit this
specialization by assuming that the agreements it regulates reflect the parties’ maximizing
choices.
Firms that attempt to maximize expected profits commonly do as well as their
circumstances permit.  This is because survivorship pressures tend to induce competence.  These
pressures take two forms: (i) Firms that systematically make bad economic decisions lose out in
competition with profit maximizing firms.  Hence, surviving firms generally can do what they set
out to do; (ii) Employees who systematically make bad economic decisions are unlikely to be
promoted to positions of responsibility.  Hence, senior managers generally can do what they set
out to do.17  This is not to say that all firms all the time pursue profit maximizing strategies.  But it
is to say that owners and the market put systematic pressure on firms to behave optimally; hence,
it is a plausible working assumption that firms rationally pursue the objective of maximizing
profits.18
to the pressures to maximize that are described above.  Second, recent evidence suggests that behavioral anomalies
can be substantially mitigated or made to disappear when individuals are asked to perform as actors in firms -- See
Jennifer Arlen, Matthew Spitzer and Eric Talley, Endownment Effects Within Corporate Agency Relationships, 31 J.
Legal Stud. 1 (2002) –, or when the applicable institutions permit communication within a group of actors and
require competition between groups -- see Do institutions promote rationality? An Experimental Study of the Three-
Door Problem, Discussion Paper #2002-21 (University of St. Gallen, Sept. 2002).  The last finding is consistent with
experiments showing that when persons are required to function in markets rather than to perform individual tasks,
the persons reach equilibria that are consistent with individually optimizing behavior.  See Vincent P. Crawford,
Introduction to Experimental Game Theory, 104 J. Econ. Theory 1, note 8 at 3 (2002) (“... repeated play of the same
game often converges to equilibrium no matter what subjects are thinking.”); Dhananjay K. Gode and Shyam
Sunder, What Makes Markets Allocationally Efficient?, 112 Q. J. Econ. 603 (1997); Same authors, Allocative
Efficiency of Markets with Zero Intelligence Traders: Markets as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality, 101
J. Pol. Econ. 119 (1993); Vernon L. Smith, Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology, 99
J. Pol. Econ. 877 (1991).  Individuals acting on behalf of firms make contracts in markets.
19Part III, infra, shows that parties need the law’s help to deal with post-contractual opportunism.
20Put simply, if a party is to receive a fixed 20% of a joint gain, it would always prefer the joint gain to be
$200 rather than $100.
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The assumption that each party to a contract wants to maximize its own profit does not
itself imply that parties also want to maximize joint gains.  Rather, a party may prefer a larger
share of a smaller pie.  Thus, parties appear sometimes to have an incentive to behave
strategically at the expense of joint welfare maximization.  On a deeper view, however, parties at
the negotiation stage prefer to write contracts that maximize total benefits.19  To see why, assume 
that each party’s share of the contractual surplus is set exogenously.  This assumption holds that a
party cannot affect the size of its share of the parties’ bargain by the (nonfraudulent) actions it
takes during a negotiation.  On this assumption, the parties will want only to maximize the total
surplus.20   To put this point in a contracting context, let parties contemplate making a simple sales
contract for goods that the buyer values at $100 and that would cost the seller $80 to produce. 
Now assume that each party’s share in the contracting surplus ($100 - $80) is fixed in advance at
one half each.  Then the price will be $90, and each party’s profit would be $10.  Of more
importance, assume that the seller could make a $2 investment in the subject matter of the
contract that would lower its production cost to $70.  The seller would want to make this
investment because then its share of the new $28 contractual surplus ($100 - $2 - $70) would be
$14, a share that would be realized by a price reduction to $86.  Similarly, the buyer has an
incentive to make cost justified value increasing investments.  
21A party’s discount rate measures his patience: the higher is a party’s discount rate, the more highly the
party values current dollars than future dollars.  Parties with high discount rates thus are impatient bargainers: they
want their share of the surplus now.  A party for whom current dollars are relatively less important -- a party with a
low discount rate -- suffers less from delay and, as a result, is more willing to reject low current offers.  Hence,
patient parties do well when bargaining with impatient parties, who will reduce their demands in order to reach
agreement quickly.
22This paragraph summarizes the Nash bargaining game with disagreement points that function as threat
points.  In this game, each party receives a payoff that equals the payoff she would receive in her next best
alternative plus an exogenously determined share of the surplus from concluding the bargain.  The game is widely
used in the contract theory literature.  See, e.g., OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL
STRUCTURE (1995) and Oliver Hart and John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. Pol. Econ.
119 (1990).   Predictions of bargaining outcomes using this game have received substantial support in the
experimental literature.  See, e.g., Joep Sonnemans, Hessel Oosterbeek and Randolph Sloof, The Relation Between
Asset Ownership and Specific Investments, 111 The Econ. J. 791 (2001); Kenneth Binmore, Alexander Shaked and
John Sutton, An Outside Option Experiment, 104 Q. J. Econ. 753 (1989).  An accessible treatment of Nash
bargaining with threat points is in JOEL WATSON, STRATEGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY
172-78 (2002).  We use this bargaining game here and in the analyses below.
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It remains for us to show that parties’ bargaining shares actually are set exogenously. 
Bargaining power is a function of two factors.  The first factor is the parties’ relative patience.
The more patient bargainer will reject offers it dislikes to wait for more favorable offers, while the
less patient bargainer will accept relatively unfavorable offers just to get a deal.21  The second
factor is each party’s disagreement point.  In order for parties to agree at all, each party must do at
least as well in the deal at hand as it could do elsewhere. Therefore, if party A has many good
opportunities should it fail to agree with party B, then party B will have to give party A a good
deal in order for the parties to contract.  On the other hand, if party B is party A’s only hope, A
will accept a less favorable offer.22
 
A business party’s patience is a function of its ability to finance its projects.  Firms that
have capital or convenient access to capital can be more patient than firms that need revenue
immediately to survive.  Parties ordinarily cannot affect the access of prospective contract
partners to the capital market.  Moreover, one party to a possible contract ordinarily cannot affect
the other party’s alternative business opportunities (its disagreement point).  Thus, each potential
contract partner will realize that its share of the maximum surplus the parties could generate
jointly has already been fixed before any contract is signed.  And this implies a preference by
each party to contract so as to maximize the size of the pie.
23This conclusion applies though parties may be uncertain about the amount of bargaining power they
actually have.  For example, parties can use a maximin strategy when they know the set of possible disagreement
points but do not know which member of the set applies to their case.  A party using this strategy evaluates uncertain
gains above the status quo by taking the disagreement point that implies the smallest gain.  As a consequence, some
efficient deals will not be made, but those that are will be pareto efficient.  See Walter Bossert and Hans Peters,
Efficient Solutions to Bargaining Problems With Uncertain Disagreement Points, 19 Social Choice and Welfare 489
(2002).  Our conclusion in the text is unaffected by this form of uncertainty because each disagreement point in the
full set is exogenous.  This set of models requires parties to reach agreement promptly on the basis on the possible
choices available to them.  When parties are optimistic about their bargaining power but can learn the truth by
inference from the sequence of offers each of them makes, they will reach efficient bargains, though with delay.  See
Muhamet Yildiz, Waiting to Persuade, MIT Dept. of Econ. Working Paper #02-38 (2002).  We do not claim that
parties always choose efficient contract terms.  The existence of asymmetric information sometimes will cause
parties to make constrained efficient contracts; these contracts are not “first best” but are efficient given the
information structure facing the parties.  In Part V, we argue that the state seldom can improve on constrained
efficient contracts because information that is unavailable to the parties is unlikely to be available to the decision
maker.
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This result is contrary to the common view.  It is widely believed that parties exercise
bargaining power by requiring weaker contracting partners to take unfavorable terms.  Thus, §2-
302(1) of the UCC authorizes a court to strike “any clause of the contract” if the clause is
unconscionable, and it is common to hear apparently one-sided terms described as the product of
“unequal bargaining power.”  However, when bargaining power is determined prior to contract
formation, as is common in business contexts, these views are incorrect.  Bargaining power
instead is exercised in the division of the surplus, which is determined by the price term.  Parties
choose the contract terms jointly so as to maximize the surplus that the price may then divide
unequally.23
B. Why the State Should Help Firms
We noted at the outset that there are four main objections to a single minded state pursuit
of welfare maximization for commercial contract law.  Part II(A) argued that the cognitive
objection is weak, and Part V(A) will argue against the fairness objection.  We discuss here the
externality and distributional objections.  The externality objection also is weak because it is
descriptively true of most commercial contracts that they affect only the parties to them.  A single
sales contract that turns out badly is unlikely to put employees out of work or cause retailers in the
firm’s locality to suffer.  It is a firm’s systematic decisions that may affect third parties in material
ways.  For example, a firm may run a factory with disregard for the environment or the rights of
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its workers.  Systematically inefficient or unfair behavior of this kind is subject to legal regulation
grouped under the headings of environmental and employment law.  Again, we take advantage of
this specialization principle to assume that the transactions that a contract law regulates do not
create externalities, unless there is a particular reason to believe that they do.
Distributional effects are an appropriate state concern, but there are several reasons why 
commercial contract rules seldom could create systematic distributional benefits for particular
classes of parties.  In the first place, commercial parties commonly occupy the roles both of seller
and buyer (or licensor and licensee, etc.).  As a consequence, a pro-seller rule would hurt firms
when they buy, and a pro-buyer rule would hurt these same firms when they sell.  In addition,
because most commercial contract law rules are defaults, distributional benefits are hard to create
even for firms that primarily buy or sell.  For example, let a contract rule allocate a risk to the
selling side of the market in order to create a distributional benefit for the buying side.  Suppose
also that contractual surplus would be maximized if buyers bore the risk at issue (because, say,
they are the cheapest cost avoiders).  A contract allocating the risk to the buyer then would make
both the seller and buyer better off (because they would be splitting a larger surplus). 
Consequently, the legal rule’s allocation would be unstable.  Because business firms attempt to
maximize contractual surplus, the default rules that constitute the bulk of commercial law thus
seldom could systematically benefit either side of the market.
Moreover, it is difficult to create distributional benefits for particular firms because firms
are owned by shareholders, and shareholders commonly hold diversified portfolios.  A diversified
shareholder often will own some firms that buy and sell, some firms that may primarily buy and
others that may primarily sell.  An attempt to benefit either side of the market distributionally is
unlikely to create net gains for such a shareholder.  Diversification also is normatively relevant. 
A diversified owner wants the value of his portfolio to increase, not the value of particular firms
in his portfolio at the expense of other firms.  Indeed, investors diversify precisely to escape firm
specific risk – the risk that a particular firm in which the investor has an interest will have an
unusually bad outcome.  The satisfaction of this preference thus requires legal rules that maximize
surplus across firms.  
24For excellent analyses of the strengths and limitations of the various autonomy-based theories of contract
law, see Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 395
(1989); Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law in The Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Jules Coleman &
Scott Shapiro, eds. 2001); and Jody S. Kraus, Theories of Contact in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (on-
line) (Liam Murphy and Joseph Raz. Eds. 2001).
25Agreements often are written even when the parties expect not to enforce them legally.  A writing reduces
disagreements over what the parties had actually agreed to do.  Disagreements as to what the contract directs raise
interpretation issues that are discussed in Part IV below.
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In sum, cogent reasons exist to justify our principal normative claim: Contract Law should
facilitate the ability of firms to maximize welfare when making commercial contracts. The reasons
set out here also imply, for this class of contracting parties, that it is unnecessary or futile for
courts or statutory drafters to pursue distributional goals.  The contract law of commercial parties
is about efficiency.
III. THE ENFORCEMENT FUNCTION
A perennial question in contract law is why the state should enforce a contract against the
wishes of a party to it.  We exclude answers to this question that take the following form: The
state should enforce a party’s contractual promises the better to permit persons to enlist other
persons in their projects, and thus to increase the sphere of autonomy within which persons can
operate.24  Or, the state should enforce promises to reenforce the morality of keeping them.  These
answers are ruled out here because the business firms that make commercial contracts are
artificial persons whose autonomy the state need not respect on moral grounds, and whose
morality is ordinarily required by positive law.  The relevant question for a normative theory of
commercial contract law is just when, if ever, does the goal of welfare maximization require legal
enforcement of the contracts that business entities make.
A. Enforcement Often is Unnecessary
A contract has an intertemporal aspect: parties agree today to do something tomorrow.25 
State enforcement of these agreements is unnecessary when the agreements fall within the self-
26For good, largely informal discussions of these issues, see Benjamin Klien, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The
Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships, 34 Econ. Inquiry 444 (1996) and Robert E. Scott, Conflict and
Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 2005, 2039-2050 (1987).
27Let S and B write a contract in a state that does not legally enforce contracts.  B later learns that it could
make $100 more by breaching the contract than by performing it.  If B breaches, however, S will no longer deal with
B.  Let B’s expected profits on these future contracts have a present value of $200.  Then B will perform the contract,
though it could not be sued for breach, because breach would cause it to lose $100 ($200 - $100).  The contract is
self-enforcing.
28For example, suppose that S’s later refusal to deal would impose only a $10 loss on the breaching buyer,
but other sellers also will refuse to deal, raising the buyer’s total loss from breach in present value terms to $200 ($10
+ a $190 reputational sanction).  Again, B would voluntarily perform.
29See Janet Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogenous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative
to Contract Law, 10 J. Legal Stud. 349 (1981).  An excellent survey of early informal enforcement mechanisms is
Avner Grief, Informal Contract Enforcement: Lessons from Medieval Trade in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND LAW 287 (Peter Newman, ed. 1998).
30For discussion, see Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation through Rules, Norms and Institutions, 99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724 (2001); same author, Merchant Law in a
Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765 (1996).  
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enforcing range or can be enforced with reputational sanctions.26  An agreement is said to be self-
enforcing when the threat by either party no longer to deal with the other is sufficient in and of
itself to induce performance.27  Reputation, in turn, will induce performance when a single
contract partner’s boycott would not.28  For reputation to work, however, potential contracting
parties must be able conveniently to learn why the parties’ deal broke down.  Reputations,
therefore, are difficult to establish in large economies in which particular contracting parties often
are anonymous to most market participants.  Rather, reputations work best in small trading
communities, especially those with ethnically homogenous members, where everything that
happens soon becomes common knowledge, and boycotts of bad actors are convenient to
enforce.29  Reputational sanctions also can be effective in industries that can establish trade
associations; the associations become a form of collective memory regarding the contracting
behavior of their members.30  This article, however, focuses on contracts that fall outside the self-
enforcing range and that cannot be enforced by reputational sanctions.  We take this focus
because parties often write the contracts it contemplates, and because we are interested in the role
31Recent theoretical and empirical work shows that when a nontrivial portion of actors in a market will act
fairly toward contract partners, fairness can substitute for reputation.  For example, party A will deal with party B not
because party B has a reputation for fairness but because party B is likely just to be a fair person.  For a review, see
Ernst Fehr, Alexander Klien and Klaus M. Schmidt, Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness, Working
Paper #72, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich (2001).  In this literature, some
individuals act in experiments as if they have a taste for fairness, while other individuals behave only out of self
interest.  Similarly, when a nontrivial portion of actors in a market will behave honestly toward contract partners,
certain efficiencies can be achieved in high transaction cost environments that would otherwise be unattainable.  See
Yongmin Chen, Promises, Trust and Contracts, 16 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 209 (2000).  It is an open question whether,
reputational considerations aside, firms have tastes for fairness or honesty.  We assume they do not for purposes of
this article in order to focus on the role of the law.
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of the law; legal rules matter when private enforcement mechanisms fail.31
Even so, the efficiency gains from enforcing contractual promises presuppose the
existence of contracts, and commercial transactions often are conducted without them.  Firms
often make simultaneous exchanges of cash for goods or services rather than exchange promises
for the later trade of these goods or services.  In this world, property law is a sufficient
encouragement to commerce because a party will only part with goods or money if the party
values more highly what is offered in exchange.  Thus, protecting property supports efficiency. 
But in contrast to simultaneous exchanges, a contract is a set of promises regarding future
behavior.  Such promises are costly to make and to memorialize.  In order to understand the role
of the state in relation to contracting behavior, it thus is necessary to explain why parties will
incur these costs when contracts are legally enforceable but not otherwise.
State enforcement is helpful to contracting parties in a number of contexts but is
particularly important in the two cases that Parts III(B) and C next discuss – when investment is
relation specific and when a bad state realization can create serious disruption costs.  We analyze
these cases both because of their intrinsic economic significance and because of their relation to
other aspects of contract law.  For example, the need to cushion an adverse state realization and
the need to avoid an adverse contract interpretation that would create similar disruption costs can
cause risk neutral parties to act as if they are risk averse.  The recognition of this should influence
legal doctrine.  The next two subparts thus treat paradigmatic cases.
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B. Encouraging Relation Specific Investment
We earlier identified the canonical contracting problem as ensuring efficient ex post trade
and efficient ex ante investment.  We assume here, per the Coase Theorem, that parties can ensure
efficient trade on their own.  For example, if the parties agreed to trade ten units, but it turns out
that trading twenty units would maximize joint gains, then the parties can modify the contract to
provide for delivery of the larger quantity.  As we will see, ensuring efficient investment is more
difficult.  The investments we have in mind would include the production of specialized goods,
the development of human capital specific to a particular deal, or research to acquire information
about future costs or prices.
We develop a simple model to explain why the state plays an essential role in encouraging
investment.  In the model, contracts are not legally enforceable.  The sellers in our story can
function in two distinct markets.  A seller can produce a generic version of a particular product
and sell the generic in a competitive market at a price that equals cost (including a return on the
seller’s investment).  The seller also can produce a specialized version of the product for buyers
who are willing to pay the extra cost.  To be precise, a buyer’s valuation for the generic product is
denoted vg and the cost of the product is simply g.  Thus, the generic will sell at the price g
(because price equals cost in competitive markets) and generate a contractual surplus of vg - g,
which we sometimes denote x.  Let a particular buyer value the specialized version of the product
at vs and let the product cost s to produce (where s > g).  Importantly, we assume that the seller’s
investment to make the specialized product would not be redeployable: if the seller were to spend
s but the deal were to break up, the seller would lose all of s.  The parties prefer a contract to
produce the specialized product when that would maximize the contractual surplus.  This leads to
their decision rule: Produce the specialized version when vs - s > vg - g.  Also, since the two
parties comprise the entire relevant world, this decision rule maximizes social welfare.
To make our example more concrete, we let the buyer value the specialized product at $80
(vs = $80); the product’s cost is $50 (s = $50); buyers value the generic version at $50 (vg = $50);
and its cost is $40 (g = $40).  On these values, the parties’ decision rule is satisfied (and social
32The buyer earns its valuation less the price, which must equal its payoff from bargaining.  Denoting the
contract price as pk, it must be that vs - pk = x + ½(dk).   Thus, pk = vs - (x + ½(dk)) = $80 - $20 = $60.  The $60 price
therefore gives the buyer a gain of $80 - $60 = $20, and it gives the seller a gain of $60 - $50 = $10.  Notice also that
bargaining power is unequal in this example: the buyer receives two thirds of the contractual surplus because the
buyer has a more favorable disagreement point ($10) than the seller has (zero).
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welfare is maximized) because the specialized product would generate a surplus of $30 while the
generic would generate a surplus of $10. 
If the parties agree to produce the specialized version, they will bargain over how to divide
the expected surplus.  We assume that the parties are equally patient bargainers because firms
commonly can purchase capital (that is, borrow) at a similar cost.  Therefore, if the parties do
contract, they will split the contractual surplus equally.  The parties’ bargaining power, recall, also
is a function of their disagreement points, and here these differ.  If the parties fail to agree on a
price for the specialized product, the seller would make the generic product, sell it for g and earn
zero profits.  The buyer, however, would earn $10 (vg - g) from buying on the market.  Neither
party would make a deal unless it was paid at least the value of its next best alternative out of the
value the deal would create.  Thus, any contract would have to guarantee the buyer $10 and the
seller at least zero.  We denote the net surplus that is to be divided by bargaining as dk.  Then dk =
vs - s - (x + 0).  This surplus is the value of the specialized product (vs) less the anticipated cost of
producing it (s) less the sum of the parties’ disagreement points (x = vg - g for the buyer, and zero
for the seller).  On the numbers we assume here, dk = $20 ($80 - $50 - $10).  Because this surplus
is split equally, the buyer receives its disagreement point x plus ½(dk), or $10 + ½($20) = $20,
and the seller receives ½(dk) = $10.  A contract price of $60 achieves this split.32  
The price at which the parties will ultimately contract, however, would not be $60 because
the buyer’s incentive to cooperate vanishes after the seller invests s in the subject matter of the
deal.  To see why, assume that the contract was made as described.  The buyer would then have
an incentive to demand renegotiation of the price after the seller’s investment.  At that point, the
investment cost s would have been sunk and so would be ignored in the new bargain: the only
issue for the parties would be whether to trade the specialized product at some price or not to
trade.  The renegotiation bargaining surplus, dr, thus would be vs - x: the value vs would be
33Recalling note 32, pr = vs - (x + ½(dr)) = $80 - ($10 + $35) = $35.
34See UCC §§2-610(a); 2-703(e)..
35See UCC §2-709.
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produced if the parties traded the specialized product; the buyer would earn x if the parties did not
trade; and the seller would earn zero.  On our illustrative values, the parties thus would split
equally dr = $80 - $10 = $70.  This split would be achieved by a renegotiation price, pr, of $35.33 
This price would divide the contractual surplus of $30 so that the buyer would gain $45 (the value
of the specialized product less the new price, or vs - pr = $80 - $35 = $45); and the seller would
lose $15 (the new price less the production cost, or pr - s = $35 - $50 = -$15).  The seller would
accept the renegotiation price, however, because it would earn zero were there no deal; and then
its loss would be the full investment cost of $50.  
The lesson that this example teaches is not that parties’ ultimate transaction prices would
differ from their initial contract prices; the point, rather, is that when contracts are unenforceable a
sophisticated seller would reject the contract to produce the specialized product.  This seller
would anticipate losing $15 under the contract as renegotiated instead of earning $10 under the
contract it initially signed.  Therefore, the seller would produce the generic product.  As said
above, this result is inefficient: the generic generates a social surplus of $10 while the specialized
product would have generated a surplus of $30.
The parties’ would cooperate to produce the specialized product, however, if the buyer’s
promise to pay the contract price pk were legally enforceable.  Under the UCC (and the common
law of contract) the seller could treat the buyer’s demand to renegotiate rather than perform as an
anticipatory breach.34  The seller then would be entitled to recover the price if the contracted for
goods could not be resold at a reasonable price.35  Since the seller could not resell the specialized
product for a positive price (its investment, recall, is assumed not to be redeployable), it thus
could recover pk = $60 from the buyer.  Knowing this, the parties would write the contract to
produce the specialized product and trade it for $60.  The seller would anticipate being
compensated for its investment, and the buyer would prefer to have the specialized product and
36A vivid example of the second best strategies used when attempting contract enforcement in weak states is
in Timothy Frye and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, Rackets, Regulation, and the Rule of Law, 16 J. Law, Econ. & Org.,
478 (2000):
“Private protection rackets primarily provide two services.  First, they provide basic protection from other
rackets and from criminals.  Second, and to a lesser extent, they help enforce agreements.  These results
suggest that private protection serves first as a substitute for the notoriously ineffective Russian police
forces.  To a lesser extent, it also serves as a substitute for the notoriously ineffective Russian courts.”
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realize a $20 surplus rather than have the generic product and realize a $10 surplus.
This analysis supports two conclusions.  First, contract remedies are thought to protect
injured promisees – the seller here – by awarding the expectation interest.  This view is true but
shallow.  If contracts were not enforceable, sophisticated commercial parties seldom would put
themselves in positions where they needed the law’s aid.  They would instead act as would the
seller here, who would produce the generic product and sell it on the market rather than subject
itself to exploitation.  Enforcement actually empowers promisors, by enabling them to make
credible promises to perform or to pay.  The buyer in our example, when a contract is
contemplated, thus wants the power to make a legally enforceable -- that is, a credible -- promise
to pay the seller the $60 contract price.  Enforcement, in sum, permits parties to make believable
promises to each other when reputational or self-enforcement sanctions will not avail.
Second, and relatedly, our example helps to explain the very small amount of foreign
direct investment that private parties have made in the former Soviet states and in many third
world countries.  Much of this investment would have been relation specific (building a factory
far from the home country, developing a mine or an oil field).  Potential investors would not deal
unless the host country or local firm could make credible promises to adhere to the terms
originally agreed upon rather than renegotiate those terms after investments had been made.  The
lack of enforcement rules and honest courts in many of these countries, however, prevents the
local parties from making promises that are more believable than was the buyer’s promise in the
example above.  In response, foreign parties do not invest.  The ability of a firm to make a
credible promise to perform that lawyers in developed countries take for granted is a regrettably
rare power in many parts of the world.36
Id. at 491-92.
37A thick market exists when there are many sellers and buyers trading a roughly homogenous product.
38The expected t1 price is E(p(t1)) = a(pk) + a(pk + z) + a(pk - z) = pk.
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C. Contracting to Avoid Disruption: The Case of Volatile Markets
Parties that function in “thick” markets37 have a choice of making a contract for future
delivery or making a spot purchase – that is, a simultaneous exchange of cash for goods.  A fixed
price contract for future delivery is understood to allocate the risk of price declines to the buyer
and of price increases to the seller.  What is less well understood is why parties write these
contracts when contracting is costly and the spot option is available.  We set out another simple
model that states this question formally and we then attempt to give a plausible answer.
In the model, the parties can make an enforceable contract at time t0 for delivery of goods
at t1, or the buyer can wait until t1 to make a spot purchase.  The parties believe, at t0, that the t1
market price could take one of three values: (i)  pk; (ii) pk + z; or (iii) pk - z.  Each of these
outcomes is thought to be equally likely; hence, viewed from t0, the expected t1 price is pk.38  This
also will be the t0 price.  To see why, realize that if the t0 price exceeded pk, sellers at t0 would
enter the market to sell contracts for future delivery at the high t0 price.  The resultant increase in
supply would cause the t0 price to fall.  On the other hand, if the t0 price were below pk, buyers
would enter to buy contracts for future delivery at the low t0 price.  The resultant increase in
demand would cause the t0 price to rise.  Hence, the unique equilibrium t0 price must be pk.  As a
consequence, if the parties did write a contract at t0 for t1 delivery, the contract price would be pk. 
To complete the model, we assume that the seller’s cost to produce or buy the goods is c # pk and
the buyer’s valuation for the goods is v = pk + z.  On these assumptions, trading the goods would
be efficient because the buyer’s valuation exceeds the seller’s cost.  If the parties do contract,
rather than have the buyer wait until t1 to buy, the cost of writing an agreement is w > 0.  Since,
price equals cost in a competitive market, the buyer will have to pay w.
39Using our illustrative numbers, E(Gk) = a($120 - $120) + a($120 - $100) + a($120 - $80) = $20.
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Actual numbers might make this story a little more concrete.  We let pk = $100; z = $20
(so v = pk + z = $120); and w = $2.  The question is whether the buyer will make the contract at t0
or make a spot purchase at t1.  
In this model, the buyer would wait.  To see why, realize that if the buyer did contract, and
contracts were enforceable, the buyer would pay the price pk and realize its net valuation z with
certainty, either because the seller performed or through a damage recovery.  The buyer’s gain
from contracting thus would be its net valuation less contracting costs, or z - w.  On our assumed
numbers, this gain would be $18 ($20 - $2).  
The buyer’s expected gain as of t0 if the buyer did not contract, however, would be the
larger sum z, or $20.  To see why, realize that without a contract the buyer would have to
purchase at the t1 market price, whatever that price turned out to be.  Since there are three equally
likely future prices, the buyer’s expected return, measured as of t0, from waiting until t1 to buy is
E(Gnk) = a[pk + z - (pk + z)] + a[pk + z - pk] + a[pk + z - (pk - z)] = z
The buyer’s spot purchase would be either made at the high t1 market price (pk + z), the average t1
market price (pk), or the low t1 market price (pk - z).  Given a buyer valuation of pk + z, the
buyer’s expected gain from not contracting, and thus saving the contracting cost w,  is just the
buyer’s net valuation z, or $20.39  
A risk neutral buyer would not pay a premium to ensure a certain gain; rather, the party
would choose a higher expected but risky gain.  The “premium” here would be the contracting
cost (w = $2); paying it would guarantee the buyer the sure $18 gain, which it prefers less than the
expected gain of $20.  A risk neutral seller too would reject a contract for the same reason.  Spot
purchases also are very common.  And if parties would not write contracts for future delivery in
thick markets were these contracts legally enforceable, there is no need to make these contracts
legally enforceable.  Thus, the question why risk neutral firms sometimes write contracts for
future delivery is not trivial.
26
We argue that parties write these contracts (when they are enforceable) to reduce the risk
of potentially disastrous outcomes.  To see the argument, realize that if the buyer in the example
did not contract, then one third of the time it would have to make a spot purchase at the high t1
price of pk + z, or $120.  Since the buyer’s gross valuation is $120, one third of the time a
purchase of the goods would contribute nothing toward the buyer’s fixed obligations.  A buyer
who failed to pay rent or interest, however, would incur serious disruption costs.  Denoting
disruption costs as f, and realizing that these would be incurred one third of the time, the
comparison in the model is misleading: The buyer’s actual decision rule would be to contract
when the net gain from contracting would exceed the net gain from not contracting, or when z - w
> z - f/3, or when w < f/3.  In this example, if the inability to contribute to fixed costs would
impose only a $30 disruption cost on the buyer, it would write a contract for future delivery ($2 <
$30/3).  
This analysis predicts that a buyer who contemplates making many transactions, none of
which will be large in relation to the buyer’s need for cash, will act as would a risk neutral person,
purchasing goods on the spot market.  When a bad realization on a single contract could seriously
endanger the buyer’s business, however, the buyer will act as if it were risk averse, purchasing the
assurance of performance at the cost of writing a contract for future delivery.  To be sure, some
such buyers could guard against disruption by maintaining sufficient cash reserves, but this
strategy is difficult for all businesses to follow.  Also, if the buyer has good business prospects,
the opportunity cost of hoarding cash likely would exceed contracting costs, especially for the
simple fixed price contracts we consider.  The result of this analysis is that the state reduces social
costs by giving parties that function in volatile markets the opportunity to make enforceable
contracts for future delivery.
In sum, when exchange is intertemporal rather than simultaneous, efficiency is enhanced
when parties can make enforceable contracts in two principal situations: When at least one of the
parties is required under the contract to make an investment that is more profitable in the
relationship than elsewhere; and when market prices are volatile and an adverse market
40Recall our assumption that parties to business contracts are risk neutral.  A third motive to contract is to
transfer risk from more to less risk averse parties.  The legal enforcement of these contracts sometimes is necessary
because the transferee of risk has an incentive to breach when large risks materialize.  Risk shifting contracts are not
considered here in part because one of the parties to them commonly is an insurer, and insurance contracts are the
subject of a distinct and heavily regulated legal field.  Moreover, although many contracts have an insurance
component (i.e., commodities contracts, currency hedging, etc.), these contracts tend not to give rise to litigation.
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movement can have spillover effects.40  In the first case, in the absence of legal enforcement the
non-investing party has an incentive to renegotiate the contract price downward rather than to
perform under the original contract.  In the second case, the party whom a market movement
disadvantages may suffer disruption costs that would much exceed its expectation interest (as that
is conventionally measured).  Contracts do sometimes fall within the self-enforcing range and
reputation can make promises to perform credible in some sub-economies.  However, nonlegal
incentives can be ineffective in larger markets and in countries where social trust is low.  Then,
without legal enforcement the ability of parties to maximize their own and their society’s welfare
is severely limited.
D. Enforcement and Duress
Enforcement entails more than simply ordering a recalcitrant party to perform.  A
supplementary set of “enforcement rules” apparently also is needed.  As an illustration, suppose
that a seller sold the goods to a third party instead of delivering them to the contract buyer.  A
specific performance order would thus be futile.  Should the buyer be able to sue the seller for
damages or to impose a constructive trust on the proceeds of the sale?  If the buyer makes a
substitute purchase, is the seller’s obligation discharged?  Let the buyer instead take delivery of
the goods but claim that they do not conform to the quality the seller promised to deliver.  Must
the buyer still pay the price and sue for damages or can the buyer cancel the sale?  Finally,
suppose that, after the contract is made but before delivery, a Federal agency passes a regulation
that prohibits production of the product the buyer purchased the goods to make.  The buyer no
longer needs the goods.  Must the buyer still pay the price?  If not, does the seller have any other
remedy?
41An ex ante duress argument succeeds if the party proves that he would not have made the challenged
contract absent the improperly coercive behavior of the other party.  The key is the law’s focus on behavior rather
than circumstances.  Thus, it is not duress on the part of an employer when a poor person accepted an offer to work
at a low wage, nor is it duress on the part of a seller to charge a high price for gas when it is the only seller for many
miles.  The employer did not create the employee’s low wealth, nor did the seller lure the buyer to the solitary spot. 
Contract law thus requires a distress claim to rest on the behavior of the promisee, not on the preexisting
circumstances of the promisor.  Chouinard v. Chouinard, 568 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1978).  This is because absent
coercion by the promisee, the promisor does better by contracting than by not contracting.  See Robert E. Scott &
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L. J. 1909, 1919 (1992).
42See, e.g, Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 29 NY.2d 124, 272 N.E.2d 533 (1971).
43Restatement (Second) of Contracts §175, Comments (a) and (b).
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These questions illustrate the complexity of the concept “enforcing a contract”.  It is
tempting to suggest, therefore, that a supplementary set of publicly supplied “enforcement rules”
also is needed.  This suggestion would be premature, however, because parties can answer these
questions in their own contracts.  For example, parties can write a “force majeure” clause
specifying the events that would excuse the seller’s obligation to deliver or the buyer’s obligation 
to pay; these events could include the possible passage of an unfavorable administrative
regulation.  That the contract laws of advanced nations commonly contain sets of enforcement
rules thus requires explanation, a task that we address in Part V of this article. 
The duress doctrine, however, is an enforcement rule that parties cannot create on their
own.  The law of duress applies in two contexts.  Ex ante duress occurs when a party is
wrongfully coerced to make a contract.41  Ex post duress occurs when a party is wrongfully
coerced to modify an existing contract.42  Contract law applies the same legal standard in both
cases: a contract or a modification is unenforceable if a party’s consent thereto was obtained by
an improper threat that left the party no reasonable alternative but to submit.43  Our focus here is
on ex post duress, and we suggest that courts should ask a different question in this case than is
appropriate for ex ante duress cases.  In an ex post duress case, the contact was fairly obtained
and the parties could have provided for the situation that later arose had they thought about the
issue. The court thus should ask whether parties with sufficient foresight would have wanted the
later modification agreement to be enforceable.
44Ex post duress cases are largely consistent with the test we propose, though the courts formally apply the
Restatement standards.  See, e.g., Austin v. Loral, supra note 42, and Wolf v. Marlton Corp., 57 N.J. Super. 278, 154
A.2d 625 (1959).
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Two examples show how this test is to be applied.  For the first, assume that the parties
initially agreed to trade 30 units at a price of $10 each.  Demand for the product turns out to be
higher than the parties initially believed: it becomes efficient to trade 50 units.  The seller offers to
transfer an additional 20 units at a unit price, for all 50, of $12.  The buyer’s profit would be
higher under the contract as modified, and it agrees to the new terms.  The buyer cannot later
claim that it was coerced to accept a price increase because, ex ante, this buyer would have
wanted the court to enforce a modification that would leave it better off than performance under
the original contract would have done.  
For our second example, return to the relation specific investment model set out above. 
There, we claimed that permitting the seller to sue for the price would deter the buyer’ threat to
renegotiate after the seller had invested.  This claim is too strong because sellers in some cases
could not make a credible threat to sue.  The seller’s threat would be credible only if it had, or had
convenient access to, the capital needed to sustain it until the buyer’s performance could be
replaced.  The buyer then would know that it would have to pay voluntarily or involuntarily.  In
contrast, a seller in a short term bind (perhaps it had purchased materials on credit and is facing
demands for payment)  may be better off accepting a low renegotiation price than bringing a law
suit.  Recognizing this, the buyer may demand renegotiation even though the contract is
enforceable.  The renegotiated contract, however, would be a product of ex post duress.  When
the initial contract was made, both parties would want a court not to enforce a purely
redistributional modification; that is, a modification that would create no new wealth but rather
would only redistribute the contractual surplus differently than did the original contract.  Parties
dislike purely redistributional modifications for two reasons.  As Part 3(B) showed, such
modifications destroy the parties’ incentive scheme for producing efficient specialized products. 
Further, the resources involved in negotiating the modification or guarding against it constitute a
dead weight loss that reduces the parties’ gain from the contract.44
45As may be obvious, the doctrine is symmetrical: it also applies to protect buyers who have made relation
specific investments from overreaching sellers.  The doctrine would be unnecessary if capital markets were perfect,
or damage suits were perfectly compensatory.   Then parties could finance all good law suits or recover all losses. 
Capital markets, however, are imperfect and damage awards are not always fully compensatory.
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The duress doctrine thus permits the seller to perform under the renegotiated contract but
later to reinstate the price term in the original contract.  This is because modifications made under
duress are not enforceable.  As a consequence, the seller in our example could pay the $35
renegotiation price, deliver the specialized goods, and later recover the difference between the
$60 contract price and the lower renegotiation price.  Sellers who have easier access to cash in the
long run than in the short run, or who could sell their legal claim, will use the duress doctrine to
recover their original expectation.  Buyers, therefore, will know that promises by sellers to pay
\renegotiation prices themselves are not credible.  The law will permit a seller to renege on such a
promise and sue for full payment.  The unreliability of renegotiation promises coerced by duress
reduces the incentive to extract them (that is, to behave as did the buyer in our example).  The ex
post duress doctrine thus is an important aspect of a publicly supplied enforcement function.45
In Part III, we argued that firms need state enforcement in order to permit them to make
credible commitments when their promises are not self-enforcing.  A court cannot enforce a
contract, however, without first determining what the contract says.  Thus, the parties’ preference
for state enforcement entails a further party preference over the set of interpretive theories that
courts could use to interpret their agreements. We next attempt to identify the interpretive theory
in this set that typical firms likely prefer.
46A theory of interpretation has two aspects: a set of rules for determining the syntactic content of a party’s
utterances; and a set of rules for determining the legal significance that should attach to the syntactic content.  We
focus on the former set of rules here because we have already developed a normative theory: Courts should enforce
business contracts as the parties to them would want the contracts enforced.  Our view regarding the separability of
the rules determining legal significance from the rules governing interpretation is not free from difficulty, however. 
Courts doing interpretation may be influenced by their view of what a good substantive outcome is when the parties’
meaning is not apparent.  See Richard Craswell, Offer, Acceptance and Efficient Reliance, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 481, 551-
553 (1996).  We ignore this complication on the assumption that if the syntactic content rules improve, the courts’
need to give legal answers to factual intent questions will lessen.  A full theory of contract interpretation would
explore more seriously the actual and ideal relation between a court’s substantive preferences and its choice of an
interpretive style.
47Most autonomy-based theories are premised either on a notion of “consent” or the exercise of will, such as
the making of a promise.  See references cited in note 24, supra.
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IV. THE INTERPRETATION FUNCTION
A. The Relevant Interpretive Question46 
There is a consensus among courts and commentators that the appropriate goal of contract
interpretation is to have the enforcing court find the “correct answer”.  The “correct answer” is the
solution to a contracting problem that the parties intended to enact.  Intention, however, is
determined objectively and prospectively: a party is taken to mean what its contract partner could
plausibly believe it meant when the parties contracted.
There are two justifications for the goal of finding the correct answer.  The first follows
from an autonomy-based view of contract law.  This justification holds that the exercise of state
coercion against a person must be justified.  A sufficient justification is that the court is making the
person do what he had agreed to do.47  Hence, the court must ascertain just what the person had
agreed to do.  The second justification is consistent with an efficiency-based view of contract law. 
On this view, parties contract to maximize the surplus that their deal can create.  This goal is
unattainable if courts fail to enforce the parties’ solution but rather impose some other solution. 
Thus, the court must ascertain the solution that the parties actually adopted.  There is a dispute in
the literature whether the rules that courts use when attempting to find the correct answer are
mandatory in the formal sense, but there is a consensus that the rules are difficult for parties to
48A recent commentator referred to the Code’s interpretation rules as “quasi-mandatory”, the idea being that
the rules are and should be very difficult for parties to avoid.  See David V. Snyder, Language and Formalities in
Commercial Contracts: A Defense of Custom and Conduct, 54 S.M.U. L. Rev. 617 (2001).  Because contracting has
positive costs, a quasi-mandatory rule will be mandatory in practice for many parties.  Other commentators believe
that the interpretation rules are mandatory.   See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in
Commercial Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 781 (1999).
49See, e.g., Samuel Williston, Contracts §631 (3d ed. 1961) (“The parol evidence rule requires, in the
absence of fraud, duress, mutual mistake or something of the kind, the exclusion of extrinsic evidence, oral or
written, where the parties have reduced their agreement to an integrated writing.”).  Willistonian formalism rests on
two basic claims: (i) Contract terms can be interpreted according to their plain meanings; and (ii) Written terms have
priority over unwritten expressions of agreement.  See Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and
Discretionary Acceleration: of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein and the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 169,
187-88 (1989).  
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escape.48
In our view, the current consensus asks the wrong question.  A commitment to party
sovereignty regarding the contract’s substantive terms implies the further commitment to party
sovereignty regarding the interpretive style an adjudicator should use to find the substantive terms. 
Party preferences regarding judicial interpretive styles can differ.  Therefore, interpretive styles
should be defaults.  The relevant question, then, is what should be the majoritarian default.  Put
another way, the issue is not what interpretive style is best calculated to yield the correct answer;
rather, the issue is what interpretive style would typical parties want courts to use when attempting
to find the correct answer.  We will argue here that the majoritarian default is Willistonian: typical
firms prefer courts to make interpretations on a narrow evidentiary base whose most significant
component is the written contract.49  This proposed default would reverse the UCC’s interpretive
rules to the extent that they are defaults; the proposal is more radical still if the Code’s rules are
mandatory.
B. Two Interpretive Issues: Problems of Meaning and of Language
We begin by clarifying two interpretive issues that commonly are commingled: What does
the language of the contract mean?  And in what language was the contract written?  To see why
these issues are distinct, suppose that there are two sets of linguistic communities.  The first set,
called M, consists of a single linguistic community.  This M community is composed of judges,
50Courts seldom distinguish between “vague” and “ambiguous” terms.  A typical judicial definition of
ambiguity, for example, includes any term or word that is “capable of more than one sensible and reasonable
interpretation or has no definite significance.”  Ross Bros. Constr. Co. v. State ex rel Transp. Comm’n, Highway
Div., 59 Ore. App. 374, 650 P.2d 1080 (1982).  More narrowly, however, a word is vague to the extent that it can
apply to a wide spectrum of referents, or to referents that cluster around a modal “best instance”, or to somewhat
different referents in different people.  For classic examples, see Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales
Corp, 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (does “chicken” include all types of chicken or only a subset?); Highly v.
Phillips, 176 Md. 463, 5 A.2d 824 (1939) (does a requirement to remove “all dirt” from a tract refer also to
subsurface sand?).  In contrast, ambiguity requires at least two distinct, usually inconsistent meanings.  See, e.g.,
Petroleum Fin. Corp. v. Cockburn, 241 F.2d 312 (5th Cir. 1957) (missing punctuation in telegram supported two
different readings); Raffles v. Wickelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (1864) (seller required to use the ship called
“Peerless” sailing from Bombay but there were two such ships).   Language commonly is vague in the sense that the
set of objects to which a word applies is rarely delineated with absolute precision.  True syntactic ambiguity occurs
infrequently.
33
lawyers, business persons and potential jurors.  The members of M read and write what we call
“majority talk” because it is the language that people typically use when attempting to
communicate with each other.  The second set is called P, and it has many linguistic communities.
Each community in the set P is composed of the parties to the contract at bar and perhaps the trade
in which the parties function.  The set P has many member communities because there are many
sets of parties and trades.  The members of each set in P may write contracts in their own “party
talk” or write them in majority talk.
The existence of plural linguistic communities raises the two interpretive issues just noted. 
Regarding the first, imagine that parties are engaged in a dispute regarding the meaning of their
written agreement. Words can be vague or ambiguous.50  If the parties agree on the language in
which their contract was written, the court’s interpretive task is limited to finding what the parties
intended that language to say.  If the parties divide on the question what language they used, the
court’s interpretive task expands: the court now must ask initially whether the parties wrote their
contract in majority talk or in a particular private language.  This question raises a separate
interpretive issue because a contract’s language could plainly mean mM in community M but also
plainly mean mP in a particular community P, where mM and mP differ.  For example, the word
“wife” in a sentence in John’s will reciting “I leave my money to my wife” would mean in the M
community that John left his money to the woman to whom he was legally married when he died. 
In a well known case, however, John and another party wrote a contract in order to dispose of part
51In re Soper’s Estate, 196 Minn. 60, 264 N.W. 427 (1935).
52For a modern example, see Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co, 451 F.2d 3 (1971) (contract specified
“Minimum Tonnage Per Year” of 31,000 tons; buyer took under 2,000 tons; the court permitted the buyer to
introduce evidence that, in the parties’ trade, stated minimum tonnages were “mere projections to be adjusted
according to market forces”).
53The distinction between party and majority talk can blur at the edges but there are core cases.  For
example, a contract written in majority talk may require the seller to deliver “red sweaters”.  Evidence regarding
usage of trade may be helpful in delimiting the permissible shades of red.  On the other hand, a contract likely is
written in party talk if one party gave to the other a written unconditional option to buy all of the stock in the
grantor’s company at a stated price by a stated date, but the parties meant “unconditional” to mean conditional.  In
the actual case, the option grantor thus claimed  that the parties intended to give the option holder the power to
exercise the seemingly unconditional option only on the condition that the grantor sought other buyers for the
company.  See Hunt Foods & Industries v. Doliner, 26 A.D.2d 41, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937, affirmed 272 N.Y.S.2d 686
(1966) (permitting the grantor’s testimony).  We return to the two language distinction in a moment and also in Part
IVD below.
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of John’s estate upon his death.51  This contract used the word “wife” to refer to the women with
whom John was living when he died but whom he had never legally married; John had deserted his
legal wife years before without divorcing her.  The word “wife” in this example would be clear to
members of the M community and would also be clear to the particular P community to which the
contracting parties belonged.  The two meanings differed, however.52  That the same word or
phrase can have different meanings in different linguistic communities thus requires courts to
make a choice.  Should courts permit parties to write contracts in the language of the parties’
choosing?  Or should courts create an incentive for parties to use majority talk by interpreting their
agreements as if the agreements were written in that language?53 
There are two traditional approaches to finding the correct answer to questions of
contractual meaning and of contractual language. They differ in the scope of the evidentiary base
each requires to make interpretations.  To be sure, a minimum evidentiary base is required for any
coherent interpretation.  This minimum base is denoted here Bmin and is composed of the parties’
contract, a narrative concerning whether the parties performed the obligations that the contract
appears to require, a standard English language dictionary, and the interpreter’s experience and
understanding of the world.  A Willistonian, or “textualist”, theory of interpretation assumes that
contracts often have “plain meanings” that are apparent to judicial interpreters.  Put formally, this
view asserts  that a court can find the correct answer on the evidentiary base Bmin.  Courts have
54Contextualist scholars do not necessarily insist on Bmax.  It is recognized, for example, that evidence in
category (3) is less reliable than evidence in category (4).
55Extrinsic evidence refers here to evidence in the five additional evidential categories listed in the text.
56A court applying the Willistonian theory will admit extrinsic evidence only when the contract’s language
is vague or ambiguous on its face.  See Pysell v. Keck, 263 Va. 457, 559 S.E. 2d 677 (2002).
57In a well known case, Justice Traynor thus stated: “The fact that the terms of an instrument appear clear to
a judge does not preclude the possibility that the parties chose the language of the instrument to express different
terms.   That possibility exists ... whenever the parties’ understanding of the words used may have differed from the
judge’s understanding.  Accordingly, rational interpretation requires at least a preliminary consideration of all
credible evidence offered to prove the intention of the parties.”  Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage
& Rigging Co., 69 Cal 2d 33, __, 69 Cal. Rptr, 561, __, 442 P.2d 641, __ (1968).
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added five evidentiary categories to this minimum base: (1) the parties’ practice under prior
agreements; (2) the parties’ practice under the current agreement; (3) testimony as to what was said
during the negotiations; (4) written pre-contractual documents (memoranda, prior drafts, letters);
(5) industry custom relevant to determining what the agreement’s words meant to the contracting
parties.  When an adjudicator admits evidence in all five additional evidentiary categories, we
denote the evidentiary base as Bmax.  A “contextualist” theory of interpretation holds that a court is
more likely to find the correct answer if the evidentiary base expands toward Bmax.54
A Willistonian theory of interpretation has the obvious effect of truncating the evidentiary
base that a court uses to make interpretations, but it also has the effect of creating an incentive for
parties to write contracts in majority talk.  Because a word can have plain but different meanings in
the M and P communities, a party seldom could establish that its contract was written in party talk
unless it could introduce extrinsic evidence.55  The Willistonian theory bars this evidence.56  In
addition, on this theory the court primarily sees the contract; hence, the parties likely can reduce
interpretive errors by writing the contract in the court’s language.  Thus, the Willistonian theory
actually resolves two distinct issues: what language the parties should speak and what evidence is
admissible to show what the parties meant in the permitted language.  Contextualists resolve the
same issues, though differently.  Their theory has courts considering all material evidence to
resolve interpretive issues; and the practical effect of so widening the evidentiary base has been to
permit parties to write in whatever language they choose.57  
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Any analysis of contractual interpretation thus should answer two questions. The first is the
question of meaning: Should courts use broad or narrow evidentiary bases in determining the
meaning of the contract’s language? The second is the question of language: Should the “linguistic
default” assume that parties write in majority talk unless their contract recites otherwise? or should
courts always admit the possibility that the parties at bar wrote in a private language?  The
practical effect of admitting this possibility is to permit a party to introduce evidence in all of the
evidential categories to show what language the parties actually used.  Part C next argues that
when the issue of the contract’s language is settled but the meaning of that language is arguably
unclear, the majoritarian default would require courts to make interpretations using the evidentiary
base Bmin.  Part D then argues that the linguistic default should suppose parties to have used
majority talk.
C. The Parties’ Preferences Regarding Interpretive Styles
 
An interpretive style can be assessed on two dimensions: (1) the likelihood that the style
will generate the correct answer (as defined above); and (2) the costs that the style imposes on
courts and parties.  We model the performance of judicial interpretive styles on these dimensions
in two ways that, in combination, capture most of the relevant cases.  Both models suppose that the
contract is complete in the sense that the writing expresses the parties’ solution to the contracting
problem at issue.  The parties are aware, however, that their meaning may not always be
transparent to a later interpreter.  They thus knowingly face the possibility that a court’s
interpretation may deviate from the correct answer.  Our initial model considers the set of cases in
which the parties’ payoffs under their contract are monotonic and continuous in the space of
possible judicial interpretations.  A party’s payoff, that is, increases as interpretations of the
contract become more favorable to it and decreases as interpretations become less favorable. 
Firms that this set of cases describes prefer courts to make interpretations on the minimum
evidentiary base Bmin except in unusual circumstances.  We then consider a set of cases in which
payoffs are invariant to the extent of judicial error.  Here, an unfavorable interpretation that is
close to the correct answer will have negative consequences for a firm that are as severe as
interpretations that are far from the correct answer.  Firms that this set of cases describes have
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reasons to prefer a broader evidentiary base than Bmin but, we argue, litigation cost considerations
will still incline a majority of these firms to want courts to use a narrow evidentiary base.  Taken
together, the two models suggest that when the question of contractual language has been settled
but the issue regarding what that language means remains, the default interpretive style for courts
should be textualist.
In both models, parties negotiate a contract whose object is to maximize the surplus the
deal could create, and they divide that surplus through the price term.  The parties want a court,
should a dispute arise, to give the correct answer to an interpretive question.  Anticipating that the
answer will be correct permits parties to take surplus maximizing actions.  Parties sign the contract
when it is optimally clear, in a sense to be made more precise below.
1. The continuous payoff case.
In this case, we focus for convenience on a buyer.  We denote the surplus under a deal as
s*; the buyer’s share is the difference between its valuation and the price: sb* = v* - p.  The
judicial interpretation that gives the correct answer is denoted i*.  Thus, if the court does make the 
interpretation i*, the contractual surplus will be s* and the buyer will realize sb*.  The illustrative
obligation we consider is the seller’s duty to prepare machines it will later deliver so as to
minimize the buyer’s costs of adjusting the machines for their intended use.  Assume that the
parties later have a dispute regarding whether the seller has fully complied with its duty to prepare
the machines adequately.  If the court imposes a lesser preparation obligation on the seller than the
obligation the contract, correctly interpreted, would require, the deal will be less profitable to the
buyer and its gain will fall to sb- < sb*.  If the court imposes a greater obligation on the seller than
i*, the buyer’s gain will rise to sb+ > sb*.   Each interpretation in the space of possible judicial
interpretations thus generates a particular payoff for the buyer.  In this product preparation
example, the buyer’s possible payoffs are monotonic and continuous in the space of possible
interpretations; that is, as interpretations become more favorable to the buyer, its payoffs increase,
and conversely.  The seller’s possible payoffs also are monotonic and continuous, but these decline
as the buyer’s increase.
58Recall that Bmin is composed of the written contract, a performance narrative, a dictionary and the
interpreter’s experience of the world.
59UCC §1-303(e)(1) (2002) (formerly §1-205(4)) provides that when there is conflict, “express terms
prevail over course of performance, course of dealing and usage of trade.”
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We begin at the litigation stage when analyzing the parties’ preferences regarding
interpretive styles, and make three assumptions: (a) A court can find the correct answer i* with
positive probability on the minimum evidentiary base Bmin;58 (b) The likelihood that a court will
find i* sometimes can be increased if the court considers evidence in categories additional to Bmin; 
(c) Courts are unbiased.   We initially support assumption (a) by observing that the written contract
trumps evidence in the other evidential categories.59  In addition, because disputes are expensive,
parties benefit from specifying obligations in such fashion that subsequently it will be clear what
was promised.  These considerations suggest that parties have an incentive to write contracts that
permit courts to discern their actual intentions.  For (b), assume that the parties specified the
seller’s preparation obligations in considerable detail in a pre-agreement memorandum that both
parties signed.  Admitting the memorandum into evidence will increase the likelihood that a court
will give the correct answer to interpretation questions that involve product preparation. 
Regarding (c), courts are assumed to be unbiased when making interpretations because there is no
reason to believe that courts will systematically deviate from the correct answer i* in ways that are
more or less favorable to a party or class of parties.
These three assumptions permit us to state formally a party’s expectation at contracting
time regarding the possible payoffs that a judicial interpretation could induce.  Continuing with our
illustration, if courts are unbiased, can find i* on the base Bmin, but can err, then the buyer’s
expected payoff given what a court later will do can be expressed as 
E(sb(i)*Bmin) = sb(i*) + , 
The left hand side of this expression is the buyer’s expected payoff given a judicial interpretation i
made on the evidentiary base Bmin.  The first term on the right hand side is the buyer’s payoff given
the correct interpretation i*; the second term is an error term with mean zero and positive variance.
That , has mean zero means that the court is unbiased: in our example, the court is as likely to
make an interpretation that is more favorable to the buyer (less favorable to the seller) than the
60For readers unversed in statistics, variance is a measure of how far an outcome can deviate from the mean
of a distribution.  Thus, if a court is unbiased but the variance is large, the interpretation that the court makes in an
actual case can be very far from the correct answer; conversely, when the variance is small, the court is likely to be
close to the correct answer.  If the contextualist claim is correct that broader evidentiary bases generate more
accurate interpretations (i.e., the variance shrinks more), it follows that litigations where the court sees only Bmin are
more risky for parties than litigations where the court sees additional evidence; for when the court sees only Bmin, its
interpretation can deviate more widely from the correct answer.
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correct answer as the court is likely to make a less favorable interpretation.  Judicial errors therefore
cancel, in expectation.  The error term has positive variance, however, because in an actual case a
court’s interpretation can deviate from the correct answer.  The expression thus says, in English,
that the buyer’s expected payoff, given the evidentiary base Bmin, equals the correct answer -- i* --
but with variance.  In other words, the buyer’s payoff under the contract equals in expectation the
payoff that the parties intended when they wrote the contract.  
When the variance in the error term is large, parties will think that the answer a court will
later give can deviate widely from the correct answer.  Our example of the pre-agreement
memorandum regarding the seller’s performance obligation thus is offered to show that adding
evidence to Bmin can shrink the variance.  In ordinary language, if the parties here know that the
evidentiary base in a later law suit will include pre-agreement memoranda, they will expect later
interpretations to be close to the correct answer.  
This specification of the relation between judicial error and party expectations implies that
firms commonly prefer courts to be restricted to the minimum evidentiary base Bmin when payoffs
are continuous in the space of possible interpretations.  To see why, recall our assumption (b): as
the evidentiary base approaches Bmax, the variance in the error term approaches zero.  A risk neutral
party cares about the mean of the interpretation distribution but not the variance, however.  This is
because the variance term measures risk while risk neutral parties are indifferent to risk.60  
Therefore, it is enough for a risk neutral firm that the expected interpretation (i) equals the correct
interpretation i*.  Put another way, a firm’s preference at contract time is to have courts make
interpretations on the minimum evidentiary base unless it would be costless to widen the base.  But
it is not costless.  The wider is the permissible evidentiary base, the more evidence a party will have
an incentive to introduce and the more evidence it will have to contest.  Since trials are expensive,
61There is considerable evidence that firms prefer a formalist adjudicatory style.  See Bernstein, supra note
30.
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risk neutral firms are Willistonians.61  
This view should not be overstated because some firms will have a different preference. 
Recall the volatile markets example in Part III(B) above.  There, we argued that firms functioning
in volatile markets would make spot purchases unless a particular transaction would be important in
relation to the size of the firm.  In that event, a firm often would prefer to incur the costs of making
a contract in order to avoid the costs of disruption that a bad market realization could cause.  A
similar preference could obtain here.  Thus, when performance of a particular contract would be
important to the survival of the firm – a contract with a major supplier, say –, or when the contract
is new and is expected to be widely used, the firm may be unwilling to risk a seriously adverse
interpretation.  If contextualists are correct that larger evidentiary bases do shrink variance, then
when variance is important parties likely will prefer courts to use a contextualist adjudicatory style. 
In the example above, if the machines were crucial to a start-up venture and the buyer had little
cash, the buyer ex ante would want the evidentiary base in a later suit to be sufficiently broad so
that the memorandum would be admitted into evidence.  On the other hand, only unusual contracts
have this “bet the ranch” quality.  In the typical case, it is good enough that courts get things right
on average.
We now turn to the contract creation stage to return to assumption (a).  It is optimal for risk
neutral firms to invest resources in drafting until the writing is sufficiently clear, in an objective
sense, so that the mean of the distribution of possible judicial interpretations is the correct
interpretation i*.  More sketchy contracts than this would generate interpretation distributions
whose mean could be anywhere.  As a consequence, parties could not expect courts to protect their
expectation interest in case of a dispute.  As this would be inefficient, firms will attempt to write
contracts with sufficient clarity to permit courts to find correct answers, though with error.
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The debate between textualists and contextualists is irrelevant to issues of interpretation for
cases that resemble the performance preparation illustration.  In this illustration, there was
consensus regarding the language in which the contract was written but that language was arguably
unclear.  The contextualist in effect asserts that a larger evidentiary base shrinks variance.  Indeed,
if the base is large enough, the variance approaches zero, so parties will believe when they contract
that a court will find the correct answer with certainty.  As applied to our illustration, admitting the
memorandum, perhaps together with an industry custom as to a seller’s preparation obligations,
would leave little doubt regarding what the seller was supposed to do.  The textualist, in contrast,
claims that variance does not shrink materially with a broader evidentiary base because contracts
often have plain meanings.  Hence, permitting parties to introduce additional evidence as to intent
would generate costs in excess of gains; for the evidence seldom would shrink the variance in the
error term by very much.  The proponents in this debate thus disagree on the relation between the
width of the evidentiary base and the accuracy of a court’s interpretation.  It is unnecessary for
courts to decide who is right.  Greater accuracy is lower variance and business parties commonly
are indifferent to variance.  Thus, courts that interpret contracts as typical parties would like them to
would be indifferent to variance as well; these courts would make interpretations on the evidentiary
base Bmin unless parties instruct them to the contrary.
 2. The invariant payoff case.
We illustrate this case by recalling the specialized product example in Part IIIA.  Denote the
quality that the contract required the seller to produce as qk.  The seller produces qk but the buyer,
possibly sincerely, claims that the contract required a higher quality level.  The product’s actual
quality is not in dispute; the issue is what the contract said. We denote an interpretation that the
contract required a lower quality level than that actually delivered as the answer q- < qk; an
interpretation that the contract required a higher quality level than the level the seller delivered is
the answer q+ > qk.  Just as before, we assume that the court is unbiased.  Therefore, the mean of
this three point distribution is qk: the seller’s expectation regarding a later judicial interpretation of
the contract can be written as E(i) = qk.
62UCC §2-601 provides that “if the goods or the tender of delivery fail in any respect to conform to the
contract, the buyer may reject the whole ....”
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The seller’s payoffs here, however, are not continuous in the space of the court’s possible
interpretations because of the perfect tender rule.62  If a court finds that the contract required a
quality level that was less than or equal to the quality the seller delivered, the seller can recover the
price; if the court finds that the contract required a higher quality level, the buyer can reject and
credibly threaten a suit for damages.  The seller then will realize a renegotiation payoff that likely is
less than the price because the damage threat reduces its bargaining power.  That judicial
interpretations are unbiased does not matter for this seller because the seller does not gain from
judicial errors on the low side (it cannot recover an amount greater than the price if it delivered a
quality level that is higher than the level the court requires), while the seller is harmed by judicial
errors on the high side, however small (any quality shortfall from an incorrectly interpreted contract
would permit the buyer to reject). The seller thus wants the court find the correct answer with
certainty, even though the seller is risk neutral.
We formalize this preference in the following way.  Let 0 # $ # 1 be the probability that the
court finds the correct answer with certainty; with probability (1 - $), the court makes an unbiased
interpretation of the contract’s required quality level.  The contract price is p; the seller’s
renegotiation payoff is denoted r # p.  On this formulation, when the parties’ contract the seller’s
expected payoff is 
E(Bs) = $(p) + (1 - $) [b(p) + a(r)].  
With probability $, the seller receives the payoff that the contract’s terms direct, which is p,
because the court will interpret the contract correctly.  With probability (1 - $), the court will make
an unbiased interpretation of the quality level the contract required.  Each of the three possible
interpretations the court could make is assumed to be equally likely; hence, when the seller is found
to have complied or over complied, which in total occur two thirds of the time, the seller receives
the contractual payoff of p, and when the seller is found to have under complied, which occurs one
third of the time, the seller receives the renegotiation payoff of r.  Note that if the parties expect $ to
equal zero, they will expect a court to make only an unbiased interpretation, with a positive
probability of error; if the parties expect $ to equal 1, they will expect a court to give the correct
63In addition to expanding the evidentiary base, the parties could also increase surplus by changing the
contract’s payoff structure.  See TAN 64-65, infra.  Since the buyer would benefit, through the price term, from
actions that increase surplus, the buyer would agree to either method when the method would be cost justified.
64A reader may note that the first model assumes that error always is possible while the second model
assumes that courts sometimes will find the correct answer with certainty.  The distinction between representations is
adopted for convenience and does not affect our conclusions.  To see why, we can rewrite the initial model so that
courts will sometimes find the correct answer with certainty.  The buyer’s expected payoff then can be expressed as
E(sb*Bmin) = $(sb(i*) + (1 - $)[sb(i*) + ,] = sb(i*) because , has mean zero.  That is, the buyer’s expected payoff
equals in expectation the correct payoff.  The models thus differ in their payoff structures, not the particular
representations of judicial error that are chosen.
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answer with certainty.  
The seller’s expected payoff under the contract – E(Bs) -- ordinarily will be lower than the
seller’s expectation interest, which is the contract price of p.  This is because $ commonly is less
than one -- the court is expected not to find the correct answer with certainty -- and r commonly is
less than p -- the seller expects to be disadvantaged in a renegotiation.  Since protecting the
expectation interest generally is efficient, the parties can increase surplus by raising the seller’s
expected payoff.  Expanding the evidentiary base may achieve this goal.63  Our assumptions
regarding the relation between the width of the evidentiary base and the accuracy of a court’s
interpretation imply that the probability of a court finding the correct answer -- $ -- rises as the
evidentiary base the court sees expands beyond Bmin.   Because the seller’s expected payoff under the
contract increases as $ increases -- as the court becomes more accurate -- the parties, though risk
neutral, thus have reason to prefer a broader evidentiary base than Bmin.  Expanding the evidentiary
base is not costless, however.  The parties, therefore, actually face a tradeoff between increased
accuracy and increased contract enforcement cost.64
Two factors influence how parties will make this tradeoff.  The first factor is the bargaining
power the seller will have in a renegotiation: the greater is the seller’s bargaining power, the more
closely the renegotiation payoff r will approach the contractual payoff p.  Then, the closer the
seller’s expected return will be to the contract price.  Hence, when the seller has bargaining power,
the parties will be less inclined to spend resources in a later litigation in order to increase $ – the
likelihood that the court will make a correct interpretation.  Recall that bargaining power is a
function of the parties’ relative discount rates, which commonly are the same, and the parties’
65Courts frequently consider extrinsic evidence when interpreting the written contract.  A commentator
recently explained: “Extrinsic evidence includes both evidence about trade customs and evidence about interchanges
between the parties – concerning the course of performance of the current contract, the course of dealing in prior
transactions, or the bargaining history of the current contract.  Very often this extrinsic evidence will not be solely
documentary and will require evaluation of oral testimony about conversations between the parties.”  See William C.
Whitford, The Role of the Jury (and the Fact/Law Distinction) in the Interpretation of Written Contracts, 2001 Wisc.
L. Rev. 931, 937.  Over 50% of tried contract cases in Federal courts are to juries, and between 25 and 30% are tried
to juries in state courts.  See Marc Galanter, Contract in Court: Or Almost Everything You May or May Not Want to
Know about Contract Litigation, 2001 Wis. L. Rev. 577. 
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disagreement points.  The seller’s disagreement point is largely a function of how redeployable is
its investment.  Its bargaining power is minimized when, as in the illustration in Part IIIA, its
investment is not redeployable at all.  The seller’s bargaining power thus increases as the subject of
sale becomes less specialized or experimental. 
The second factor influencing the parties’ tradeoff between accuracy and cost is how
productive a piece or category of evidence would be in increasing the likelihood that a court will
make a correct interpretation.  In the example above, the introduction of a single piece of evidence –
the pre-agreement memorandum – was assumed to increase materially the probability that the court
would find the correct answer.  The memorandum thus was very productive, generating a large
increase in accuracy at a low cost.  When evidence is expected to be less productive, parties will be
less inclined to have courts make interpretations on a broad evidentiary base.
This analysis of the relevant tradeoff suggests that parties whom the payoff invariant case
describes would more commonly prefer a narrow evidentiary base for interpretations.  Initially,
many more deals are for relatively standard goods that a party’s specialized investment will
improve than they are for goods that would be worthless in uses other than those the parties
contemplate.  Thus, parties such as the seller here ordinarily could redeploy a significant fraction of
their investment, and so would have a nontrivial amount of bargaining power in a renegotiation. 
Further, the choice that parties commonly face in contract actions is not between admitting a
particular piece of evidence or not admitting it; the choice is between a summary judgment motion
on the contract – on Bmin – or a trial, often before a jury.65  Trials can be very costly.  Thus, parties
apparently would prefer broad evidentiary bases either when their performance would be highly
specialized or when an evidential category in addition to Bmin would be very productive -- a clear
66Richard Craswell shows, however, that courts evaluate the probativeness of customs by evaluating the
purposes that the customs are meant to serve.  See Richard Craswell, Do Trade Customs Exist? in THE
JURISPRUDENCE OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 118 (2000).  This suggests that custom
evidence is costly to admit and to contest.
67See UCC §2-717.
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custom, for example.66  Since these illustrations apparently capture only a minority of cases, we
suggest that the majoritarian preference in the payoff invariant case also is for courts to use narrow
evidentiary bases when making interpretations.  Turning again to the contract creation stage, given
this preference typical parties would invest resources in drafting just to create the evidentiary base -
- Bmin -- that would permit a court to make an unbiased interpretation.
Where payoffs are discontinuous in the interpretation space, however, parties also have the
ability to protect the seller’s expectation without expanding the evidentiary base.  Their method is to
change the contract’s payoff structure.  The structure of the payoff invariant case creates the
possibility that a party will incur a large loss because of a small judicial error.  The seller in the
example here thus could suffer substantially if the court held that it to had to produce only a slightly
higher level of quality than the correctly interpreted contract required.  It is this “knife-edge”
property of the perfect tender rule that reduces the seller’s expected payoff below the price and so
creates an incentive for parties to contract out of the rule.  The common way to do this is to use the
customary warranty term, which contains a repair and replacement clause that eliminates the
buyer’s right to reject but requires the seller to repair or replace defective tenders or parts of
tenders.  When the buyer cannot reject, the seller is entitled to the price, with damages deducted
from it.67  The customary warranty thus eliminates the knife-edge feature of the perfect tender rule,
thereby ensuring that both parties’ expectation will be protected if they believe that their payoffs
will be determined by the correct interpretation of the repair and replacement clause. 
This condition will be satisfied because the repair and replacement clause is analytically
similar to the product preparation term considered in Part IV(B)(1).  Under that term, a party’s
expected payoff, E(sb(i)), equaled the correct interpretation, i*.  To see why the repair and
replacement clause has the same property, recall that UCC §2-719 permits a seller to limit the
buyer’s remedies to repair and replacement, while §2-608(1) permits the buyer to “revoke his
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acceptance” only if a “non-conformity substantially impairs its [the good’s] value to him”.  Section
2-719(2) authorizes a court to refuse enforcement to a repair and replacement clause if
“circumstances cause ... [the] limited remedy to fail of its essential purpose....”  Comment 1 to §2-
719 explains that this authorization exists because “there must be at least a fair quantum of remedy
for breach of the obligations or duties outlined in the contract.”   In light of these sections, a court’s
interpretive task under a repair and replacement clause is not to see if the goods fail to conform to
the contract in any respect.  Instead, the initial question for a court is whether the degree of success
the seller achieved in the repair or replacement task was such as to give the buyer “a fair quantum
of remedy.”  If not, the clause becomes inoperative and the question shifts to whether the goods are
“substantially impaired” in value.  The buyer’s possible payoffs under a repair and replacement
clause thus increase as the court requires the seller to exceed the correct interpretation and decrease
as the seller is permitted to fall short, just as the payoffs in the product preparation case.  And since
the seller’s payoffs here are a function of the buyer’s payoffs, the seller’s possible payoffs also are
continuous in the same way.  Both parties thus will expect the payoff under a repair and
replacement clause to equal in expectation the payoff the parties intended.  This suggests that
parties choosing a repair and replacement warranty will want courts to interpret the warranty using
the minimum interpretive base Bmin.  This is because, as we have argued above, it is ordinarily
enough for business parties that courts are correct in expectation, not that they are always correct.
3. Summary
The case in which the parties’ payoffs are continuous in the space of a court’s possible
interpretations covers a lot of the ground.  This is because the case often arises “naturally”, as in the
product preparation example, and can arise “artificially”, as when parties contract to create
continuous payoffs in order to increase the efficiency of their payoff structure.  Firms that the case
describes ordinarily prefer courts to follow a textualist interpretive style.  The case in which the
parties’ payoffs are invariant to the degree of judicial error probably is less common.  Even in this
case, however, litigation cost considerations will cause a majority of parties to prefer courts to use a
narrow evidentiary base.  Therefore, the best interpretive default for firms is textualist when the
issue is what their contract language meant.
68See Peter Linzer, The Comfort of Certainty: Plain Meaning and the Parol Evidence Rule, 71 Fordham L.
Rev. 799 (2002); Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law: A Comparative Analysis of Common
Law and Code Methodologies in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND
COMMERCIAL LAW  149 (J. S. Kraus & S. D. Walt, eds., 2000).
69See Comment 1 to UCC §1-205: “This Act rejects both the “lay-dictionary” and the “conveyancer’s”
reading of a commercial agreement.  Instead, the meaning of the agreement of the parties is to be determined by the
language used by them and by their actions, read and interpreted in light of commercial practices and other
surrounding circumstances.”
70If parties preferred courts to use evidentiary bases so broad as to foreclose judicial time for deciding other
categories of case, then courts should override the parties’ preference.  This danger would not occur when parties in
general want adjudications to be briefer than they now are, and there seem no other possible negative third party
effects from judicial deference to the parties regarding interpretive styles.
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We conclude this section with a comment concerning judicial practice.  Courts making
common law adjudications commonly take a Willistonian approach68, while the UCC strongly urges
a contextualist interpretive style.69  Courts in general, however, treat interpretation rules as
mandatory.  Judges are reluctant to invoke the coercive machinery of the state to require a party to
perform a contract (or to pay damages) unless the judge is satisfied that the contract actually
directed what the party failed to do.  It seemingly follows that courts, not parties, should choose the
rules that determine how contracts are read.  This view is understandable but misguided.  The law in
general permits persons and firms to make litigation relevant choices even though a consequence of
those choices is that courts may act on less than full information.  For example, persons and firms
may waive the right to counsel, agree to stipulated findings of fact, and use summary arbitration
procedures whose results courts are required to enforce.  In sum, the law generally sacrifices
accuracy in adjudication to persons’ self interested choices.  Similarly, parties should be permitted
to realize the cost savings from contract interpretations on minimal evidentiary bases even if, in any
given case, the odds of an accurate interpretation would be higher with a broader base.70
D. Private Languages, Linguistic Defaults and the Parol Evidence Rule
1. The preferred linguistic default.
We now consider the case in which the parties have written a complete contract in some
language. The issue is whether, if the contract is silent on the matter, a court should take the parties
to have written in majority talk.  The alternative judicial assumption would hold that the parties
71The position that a party always should be able to show that its contract was written in party talk
sometimes is justified on autonomy grounds.  Thus, Justice Traynor explained in Pacific Gas and Electric Co., supra
note 53,:  “In this state, ... the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract is the source of contractual rights
and duties.  A court must ascertain and give effect to this intention by determining what the parties meant by the
words they used.” at __.   This argument is a non sequitur as stated.  No one would claim that the Statute of Frauds
interferes with party autonomy in a normatively serious way, though the Statute sometimes requires parties to cast
their agreements in written form.  It apparently would not be a serious interference with autonomy for courts also to
assume that parties cast their agreements in majority talk if good reasons exist to create the incentives that this
assumption implies.  Thus, it takes more argument than now exists to show that an autonomy based view of
interpretation would justify the rule Justice Traynor stated, even if such a view were appropriately applied to firms.
72UCC §2-202, Comment 2 (emphasis added).
73Some scholars argue that if courts are Willistonian, and thus implicitly adopt majority talk as the linguistic
default, parties will incur additional drafting costs translating their private language into the majority language in
order to make their intentions clear to judicial interpreters.  See Jody S. Kraus and Steven D. Walt, In Defense of the
Incorporation Strategy in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL
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preferred, should a dispute arise, to have the opportunity to introduce extrinsic evidence that
relevant parts of the contract were written in the parties’ private language.  We next set out four
reasons why the “linguistic default” should hold that the contract was written in majority talk. The
practical implication of this proposal is that, when a contract does not speak to the issue, the court
should not go beyond the evidentiary base Bmin when attempting to identify the language of the
contract.71 
Many parties would prefer the linguistic default we propose because the default would (a)
reduce contracting costs; (b) minimize the opportunities for strategic behavior; (c) reduce the risk of
judicial error; and (d) expand the set of efficient contracts parties could write.  Beginning with the
issue of contracting costs, the comments to UCC §2-202 adopt a strong contextualist linguistic
default.  Thus, Comment 2 recites: “writings are to be read on the assumption that the course of
prior dealings ... and the usages of trade were taken for granted when the document was phrased
[that is, were meant to be aids in interpretation] unless carefully negated....”72  But if the default
were reversed, parties could contract out of a plain meaning linguistic default at the same or a lower
cost.  For an example, consider: “This agreement is to be read in light of the customs of the widget
trade”.  Parties seldom would describe the actual customs in the agreement because contracting
costs are incurred today with certainty while dispute resolution costs are incurred tomorrow and
probabilistically.  Thus, it ordinarily will be cheaper just to tell courts to consider custom should an
irreconcilable difference later arise.73   In addition, a minority of contracts are written largely in
LAW 193 (2000).  This argument assumes that parties can only opt out of the plain meaning linguistic default with
costly translations.  But as the discussion in the text has shown, parties can cheaply opt into a private language by
agreeing in their contract to have evidence admitted regarding that language should a dispute arise.  We can expand
this argument with the observation that even when contracts contain technical party talk, most of their words will be
written in the majority language.  For example, parties may attribute a private meaning to the phrase “two by four”
(wood supports so described in construction contracts are meant to state dimensions of 17/8" x 33/4"), but such
parties seldom would use a private language to describe the delivery date, the place of delivery, the price and so
forth.  These parties would want words with trade language meanings to be read with trade understanding, but would
not want words written in the majority language to be read as if they were special.  If the linguistic default is
whatever language parties choose, then parties who wish to exclude party talk interpretations of majority talk must
identify all of the majority terms and explicitly negate the use of extrinsic evidence for interpreting them.  On the
other hand, by opting into only the technical party talk they wish to incorporate, parties can more readily unbundle
the two types of language.  Hence, if courts are Willistonian just when parties want them to be, parties will not incur
unnecessary writing costs.
74The current interpretive rules are mandatory (or “quasi mandatory”).  For the purpose of our discussion
here, which focuses on party preferences, it is clarifying to treat the rules as defaults.
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private languages, and the parties that write them frequently enforce them with expert arbitrators,
not lay judges.  Thus, fewer parties would have to contract out of a default that supposed them to be
writing in majority talk than would have to contract out of the contrary default.74
A plain meaning linguistic default -- that is, a default which restricts the court to the
interpretive base Bmin -- also would reduce strategic behavior.  To see why, focus first on the ex post
case, and consider a contract between party A and party B whose relevant provisions were written
in party talk.  This contract, suppose, turns out badly for party B.  It would like to raise an
interpretation issue strategically, claiming that the contract was written in majority talk, in order to
improve its bargaining position.  B could raise such an issue only if it could plausibly show that
words in the parties’ private language had a clear but different meaning in the majority linguistic
community.  B would raise the interpretive issue only if the different plain meaning would also
relieve it from performance.  These two conditions for avoiding the effect of a private language are
difficult to satisfy because while there are many private languages there is only one majority
language.  Hence, it would only be coincidence for words in a particular private language also to
have a clear but different meaning in the majority language that favored a litigant such as B.  Now
assume that the contract was written in majority talk.  The multiplicity of possible private languages
would permit party B more easily to assert a helpful private meaning.  A common move is to claim
that stated prices or quantities are only “estimates” or “projections” in the private language the
75As an example, a contract required the buyer to take “approximately 70,000 cubic yards of cement” and
also recited that “no conditions which are not incorporated in this contract will be recognized.”  The buyer took a
little over 12,000 yards in a falling market and successfully claimed that parties in the trade understood explicitly
specified quantities to be estimates.  See Southern Concrete Services, Inc. v. Mableton Contractors, Inc., 407 F.
Supp. 581 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
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parties used.75  Turning to the ex ante case, on the linguistic default we favor, a party would have to
propose to its contract partner that the contract be interpreted in a particular private language.  The
partner would agree only if there were such a language, and its meanings would be accessible to
courts.  Thus, requiring parties to say they are writing in a private language would largely
ameliorate the concern that a party would attempt to rescue itself from a bad deal by claiming that
the contract was written in a mythical private language.
The two linguistic defaults at issue now can be reconsidered in light of this analysis.  If a
court would permit parties always to prove that they wrote in a private language, then a
disappointed party would have a strong incentive to attribute a fictional favorable private meaning
to a majority talk contract.  A default that supposes parties to be writing majority talk unless their
contract recited otherwise would eliminate this move.  And then if parties actually did write in a
private language and contracted out of the Willistonian default, it would be difficult for one of them
later to behave strategically regarding interpretation because, we have just shown, the conditions for
avoiding particular private languages are so stringent.  The linguistic default that supposes parties to
be writing majority talk thus would reduce strategic behavior more effectively than the rules in the
comments to today’s Uniform Commercial Code.
A plain meaning linguistic default that assumes parties to be writing in majority talk also
would reduce the risk of judicial error.  This is because, as said, there is one majority linguistic
community but many possible private communities.  Hence, when private languages are
permissible, as they often are today, a court has two interpretive tasks: to ascertain the parties’
language and to ascertain what the parties said in that language.  A court that picks the wrong
language necessarily will pick the wrong meaning.  This danger is real because a private linguistic
community can be as small as the parties to the contract.  Hence, a disappointed party may plausibly
claim that the parties’ course of dealing or their oral negotiations showed that, in the parties’
76Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G.W. Drayage & Rigging Co., supra note 53.
77Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971).
78Hunt Foods & Industries v. Doliner, supra note 50.
79A formal treatment of the relation between contracting costs and the parties’ choice of contractual form is
Alan Schwartz and Joel Watson, Economic and Legal Aspects of Costly Contracting, Mimeo (2003).
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language,  “all” meant “some”76; agreeing to take a “minimum” quantity meant that the buyer could
take much less77; an unconditional option is conditional.78  When such a claim is false but found to
be true, the court necessarily will misinterpret the contract.  
To see why, recall our argument in Part IVC that firms are content to have courts be right on
average, not right every time.  The error here is different from the error described there.  For
example, let a contract use the word “red”, and let a party persuade the court, wrongly, that the
parties used a private language in which the word “red” meant “green”.  Both red and green are
vague.  The space of possible judicial interpretations of the illustrative contract would likely center
around some modal instance of the concept “green”, but the court here would not be right on
average; for the parties actually intended the court to be construing the word red.  When courts are
mistaken regarding the contract’s language, that is, their constructions must be inefficient because it
is only efficient to protect a party’s expectation interest under the contract it actually wrote.  Hence,
parties face a heightened risk of inefficient interpretations when courts always entertain claims that
a contract was written in a private language.  Typical parties thus would prefer courts to assume that
they wrote in majority talk.
Finally, contextualist interpretation in general, and especially contextual interpretation that
permits the use of private languages, can truncate the set of efficient contracts that parties can write. 
To understand this point, recognize that the cost of writing a contract includes the expected cost of
enforcing it.  We have just argued that contextualist interpretation can create moral hazard.  The
more complex the contract, it is plausible to believe, the easier it will be to create disputes regarding
what the contract says and what language it was written in.  This creates the possibility that
contextualist interpretive regimes encourage parties to use simpler but possibly less efficient
contracts.79
80Recall that price equals cost in competitive markets.
81The seller’s expected return is .7(10) + .3[b(10) + a(-15)] = 9.
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To illustrate, recall the relation specific-investment example in Part III(A), where the seller
chooses between producing a generic product at a zero gain or a specialized product at a gain of
$10.  We now assume that this contract costs the parties $5 to write, split evenly, while a contract
for the generic product would cost $2 to write, which the buyer pays.80  Begin by assuming that the
parties do write the contract to produce the specialized product.  The buyer again rejects on quality
grounds.  We now suppose, as in the invariant payoff case of Part IV(C)2, that if the court uses a
contextualist interpretive style, it will find the correct answer (so that the seller will realize $10)
with a probability of .7.  Conversely, the court will make an unbiased interpretation of the contract’s
required quality level with a probability of .3.  In this event, the seller will receive the contractual
payoff of $10 two thirds of the time, and the low renegotiation payoff of -$15 one third of the time. 
The seller’s expected return under this interpretive style thus is $981 minus its share of the
contracting cost ($2.50)  minus enforcement cost.  In the textualist regime, the court is assumed to
find the correct answer only .5 of the time, so the seller’s expected return is $8.34 minus contracting
and enforcement costs.
We use the argument that a contextualist interpretive regime creates a greater incentive for
moral hazard to suppose that the seller could enforce the contract on summary judgment in a
textualist interpretive regime, but would be forced to a trial in a contextual regime.  Putting numbers
to this assumption, we let the expected cost of a summary judgment action be $4 and the expected
cost of a trial be $8.  As a consequence, the seller would have a negative expected return of $.50 in
a contextualist regime and a positive expected return of $1.84 in a textualist regime.  Therefore, if
the court’s expected interpretive stance were contextual, the seller would only agree to produce the
generic product.  Note too that this result obtains when the seller has the least bargaining power that
it could have; for we assumed above that its investment in the specialized product is not
redeployable at all.
82This conclusion may be thought to raise a regress problem.  If parties can give interpretive instructions,
then those instructions will themselves have to be interpreted, as would instructions as to how to interpret the
instructions and so forth.  This problem does not appear to be serious.  The default we advocate would require parties
to tell courts to widen the evidentiary base.  For example, the contract would recite: “Use custom”.  There seems
little reason for parties to say “Use custom sympathetically”.  Courts seldom would need instructions as to how to
interpret simple directives that refer the courts to evidentiary categories now in use.
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When parties compare possible interpretive regimes, they will not only consider ex post
enforcement costs and gains; they will add the present value of the net to the cost of writing a
contract.  In the example here, doing that would cause parties to prefer the simple but less efficient
contract for the generic product to the more complex but more efficient contract for the specialized
product.  To be sure, an example cannot show that contextualist interpretive regimes always induce
parties to use less efficient contracts.  The lesson rather is that an overlooked cost of these regimes
is that they sometimes buy greater accuracy at a cost of less efficient contracting.  This
disadvantage reenforces our view that business parties generally prefer a plain meaning linguistic
default, which implies the use of a Willistonian interpretive style.
The analysis here permits further us to clarify the debate between contextualists and
textualists and also suggests a new understanding of the function of merger clauses. Contextualists
claim that interpretations made on broad evidentiary bases are more likely to be correct than
interpretations made on narrow bases.  Textualists dispute this claim.  The dispute between these
camps, we have shown above, is irrelevant when the issue is what the contract says: business firms
are content with interpretations of their language that are correct on average, not always correct,
and so prefer narrow evidentiary bases to broad ones.  The interpretation dispute matters a great
deal, however, when the interpretive issue concerns the language in which the parties wrote.  In
such a case, we have argued, a broad evidentiary base affords a disappointed party the opportunity
to raise the language issue strategically.   Broad evidentiary bases also increase the risk of judicial
error and truncate the set of efficient contracts parties can write.  Our analysis thus supports the
conclusion that courts should interpret business contracts on minimal evidentiary bases whether the
issue is what the contract language means or what language the contract was written in, unless
parties explicitly instruct the court otherwise.82
83A merger clause recites that the written agreement is the parties’ final expression of their intentions.  A
common example states:
This contract contains the final understanding between the parties, and represents the final agreement on all
terms.  There are no verbal agreements or representations in connection therewith.  The writing is a merger
of all proposals, negotiations and representations with reference to the subject matter and provisions.
See, e.g., Luther Williams, Jr., Inc. v. Johnson, 229 A. 2d 163 (D.C. App. 1967); UAW-GM Human Resource Center
v. KSL Hotel Corporation, 228 Mich. App. 486, 579 N.W. 2d 411 (1998).
84See Franklin v. White, 493 N..E. 2d 161, 166 (Ind. 1986) (“An integration clause is only some evidence of
the parties’ intentions.  The trial court should consider an integration clause along with all other relevant evidence on
the question of integration.”); Sutton v. Stacey’s Food Mart, Inc., 431 A.2d 1319, 1322 (Me. 1981) (Citing
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §216, comment e, which provides that “A merger clause does not control the
question whether the writing was assented to as an integrated agreement.”); Restatement (Second) of Contracts §209,
comment b: “Written contracts may include an explicit declaration that there are no other agreements between the
parties, but such a declaration may not be conclusive.”).  Professor Corbin is regarded as the most persuasive
advocate of this position: “It can never be determined by mere integration of the words of a writing whether it is an
‘integration’ of anything, or whether it is the ‘final and complete expression of the agreement.” 3 Arthur Corbin,
Contracts §581 at 442.  
85We argue that courts should adopt a Willistonian linguistic default because parties prefer it, but there also
are “external” efficiency reasons to justify the default.  First, the state subsidizes the judicial system and thus has an
independent reason to reduce the likelihood of disputes.  For the reasons given, our default would do better at this
than current law.  Second, if contracts are written in majority talk, courts can create standard vocabularies in which
commercial transactions can be conducted.  When a phrase has a set, easily discoverable meaning, parties who use it
will know what the phrase requires of them and what courts will say the phrase requires.  Courts that insulate the
meaning of terms in the majority language from deviant interpretations – that interpret the same words in the same
ways across cases – thus create a collective good: a set of terms with meanings that are already understood by a large
majority of potential contracting parties.  It follows that courts should encourage parties to use majority talk.  See
Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. L. Rev. 847, 853-56 (2000); id., The
Uniformity Norm, supra note __ at 157-58; Alan Schwartz, Contract Theory and Theories of Contract Regulation, 92
Revue D’Industrielle 101 (2000).
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Merger clauses are understood to have the function of restricting the evidentiary base
available to courts when making interpretations.83   Because courts today often search broadly for
the correct answer, merger clauses are difficult for parties to enforce.84  These clauses now can be
seen to have an additional function.  A merger clause, if honored, would limit the court to the
evidentiary base Bmin.  When courts see only this base, parties have a strong incentive to write the
contract in majority talk.  Hence, when parties do adopt a merger clause, they are telling the court
that they are speaking its language.  The realization of this should incline a court that is not
persuaded by the arguments here to permit a merger clause to bar the admission of extrinsic
evidence offered to show that the contract at issue was written in party talk.85
86UCC §2-202(a).
87See Whitford, supra note 65, at 939; Eric Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and
the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. Penn. L. Rev. 533 (1998).
88See Ben Shahar, supra note 48; Snyder, supra note 48; and etc.
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2. The parol evidence rule.
A typical statement of the parol evidence rule provides that when terms are “set forth in a
writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement”, the terms “may not be
contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may
be explained or supplemented by course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade.”86 
This rule comes in a “hard” and a “soft” version.  Courts that adopt the hard version of the parol
evidence rule decide whether a written contract is ambiguous from the document itself; that is, the
court makes an interpretation on the evidentiary base Bmin.  Courts that adopt the soft version hear
all extrinsic evidence before deciding whether there is an ambiguity.87  The UCC and a number of
common law courts are taken to have adopted the soft version.88   As should be apparent, this
version of the parol evidence rule is justifiable if courts should consider all evidence that may bear
on what the parties meant, but it is not justifiable if courts should consider only the evidence that
parties, ex ante, want courts to see.  
Contrary to the conventional understanding, however, the UCC version of the parol
evidence rule actually creates a strong incentive for parties to write in majority talk.  Under §2-202,
extrinsic evidence cannot “contradict” a writing but can “explain or supplement” the writing. 
Suppose that a contractual phrase has the plain meaning mM in majority talk and the equally plain
but different meaning mP in party talk.  If a party can introduce extrinsic evidence explaining that
the contract actually had the meaning mp, then extrinsic evidence never could contradict the writing. 
The meaning mp would not “contradict” the meaning mM because the writing, properly understood,
never meant mM.  Put more vididly, if a party may introduce extrinsic evidence to show that the
parties meant “green” when they wrote “red”, extrinsic evidence could “explain” but never
“contradict” their contract.  A contradiction could arise only if the contract were written in majority
talk and the extrinsic evidence was offered to show a different meaning in that language than mM. 
Therefore, unless the word “contradict” is read out of the statute, section 2-202 must be taken to
89This proposed interpretation of §2-202 actually was made in Southern Concrete Services v. Mableton
Contractors, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 581 (N.D.Ga. 1975).  The contract there required the defendant to take
“approximately 70,000 cubic yards” of concrete.  The defendant purchased 12,542 cubic yards.  It defended the
subsequent law suit with the claim that trade custom and supplementary agreements between the parties would show
that “the quantity stipulated in the contract was not mandatory ... and that both quantity and price were understood to
be subject to renegotiation.”  The court excluded the evidence because it believed that an explicit quantity
requirement would be contradicted by an understanding that the requirement was not mandatory.  It explained: “To
admit evidence of an agreement which would contradict the express terms of the contract would clearly eviscerate
the purpose of §2-202.”  Id. at __.
90UCC §§ 2-202(a); 2-208.  Comment 2 to §2-208 provides that “a course of performance is always relevant
to determining the meaning of the agreement.”
91See e.g., UCC §2-208, Comment 1: “The parties themselves know best what they have meant by their
words of agreement and their action under that agreement is the best indication of what that meaning was.”
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presuppose that contracts are written in majority talk, but to permit the introduction of extrinsic
evidence to clarify ambiguities in this language.  In contrast to the comments to section 2-202, the
Code itself thus adopts the linguistic default for which we argue.89
 
3. Course of performance evidence.
The UCC explicitly invites courts to consider the parties’ course of performance under a
contract because such evidence is said to be “always relevant” to the contract’s meaning.90  If the
state is to provide the interpretive theory that the parties want, however, then supplementing
contracts with course of performance evidence would frequently be a mistake.  The parties’ course
of performance under a contract differs from evidence in the other evidential categories because it
can be offered not only to show what the parties originally meant, but also to prove that the parties’
meaning had changed.  Thus, evidence that the buyer accepted shipments at quality levels below
those the contract specified may show that the parties modified the contract’s quality requirement. 
Admitting course of performance evidence to prove a change in meaning is consistent with the
traditional contract law rule that the parties’ agreement may be inferred from acts or silence.91 
Nevertheless, courts should be reluctant to admit act or acquiescence evidence to show a change in
the meaning of a written contract.  The existence of a writing indicates that the parties once
believed that the gains from writing things down exceeded the costs.  The best inference to be
drawn from the absence of evidence that this calculus has changed is that parties want modifications
to be written as well.  And if this inference is not compelling, it should become so when the contract
92See UCC §2-209(4): “Although an attempt at modification or recission does not satisfy the requirements
of subsection (2) [excluding modifications except by a signed writing], it can operate as a waiver.”  Comment 4
explains that “subsection (4) is intended , despite the prohibition of subsection (2) ..., to prevent contractual
provisions excluding modification except by a signed writing from limiting in other respects the legal effect of the
parties’ actual conduct....”
93This example was stimulated by the model in Ben-Shaher, supra note 48, but his model apparently  
assumes that deviations impose the same loss in each period rather than the same loss on average.  On his
assumption, parties are indifferent to whether courts admit course of performance evidence to show a change in
meaning or they do not.  Ben-Shaher later relaxes the same loss assumption, however, and then concludes, as we
next do, that the soft version of the parol evidence rule will disadvantage typical parties.
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contains a term requiring modifications to be in writing.  Courts, however, accepting the UCC’s
invitation, often hold that conduct can waive a “no oral modification” clause.92
The Code and the courts’ use of course of performance evidence to establish a change in
meaning reflects a misunderstanding of the parties’ likely intentions.  To see why, consider the
quality level illustration in the preceding paragraph.  Suppose that the contract price was $2000 per
lot delivered and the contract contained a “no oral modification” clause in addition to the quality
specification.  The parties expect that deviations from the specified contract quality will sometimes
occur.  The expected loss that the average deviation (the probability of a deviation times the cost)
imposes on the buyer is $100.  Thus, sometimes a deviation will create a cost that approaches zero
(perhaps the buyer has forgiving customers or the quality shortfall can be quickly corrected).  At
other times, a deviation can impose a loss whose expected value equals or exceeds $500 (say the
buyer has a new, potentially large customer for whom quality is important, or the particular
deviation would be slow to correct in a high demand period).  The parties also know that it would
not be cost justified to litigate against the average quality shortfall ( the litigation cost, say, would
be $150 per deviation).93  
The contract in this example has three salient features: (i) The price does not fall with
declines in the level of quality supplied; (ii) There is a written specification of the quality the seller
is to deliver; (iii) There is a “no oral modification clause”.  These contractual features support two
conclusions respecting the interpretive relevance of course of performance evidence. First, the
parties do not expect to litigate the average quality deviation; rather, the expected cost of these over
the life of the contract is reflected in the fixed price.  Second, high cost deviations in product quality
94Our argument here is similar to Llewellyn’s view of custom.  He believed that customs govern ordinary
cases but seldom are relevant to the unusual cases that cause parties to litigate.  See Alan Schwartz, Karl Llewellyn
and the Origins of Contract Theory in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND
COMMERCIAL LAW __ (J. S. Kraus and S. D. Walt, eds., 2000).
95Arbitrators obey the parties’ interpretive instructions but courts do not.  Our analysis thus identifies a
reason for parties to use arbitration, but it cannot support the inference that parties use courts because they prefer the
interpretive styles in current use.  There are other reasons for using courts, such as the ability to get discovery, to
have appeals, to have the substantive law applied by experts in it, to create effective precedents and the like.  See
Kenneth S. Abraham and J.W. Montgomery, The Lawlessness of Arbitration, Mimeo 2002; Charles L. Knapp,
Taking Contracts Private; The Quiet Revolution of Contract Law, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 761 (2002).  The widespread
use of merger and no oral modifications terms in contracts intended for courts also suggests, in line with our views,
that parties who prefer judicial enforcement also prefer enforcement under a different interpretive style.
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are prohibited.  From this it follows that the seller could not plausibly infer from the buyer’s
acceptance of nonconforming deliveries causing average losses that the buyer also will accept
nonconforming deliveries that would impose large losses.  And if this inference is prohibited to the
seller, it also must be prohibited to the court. 
This example captures an important feature of contracting behavior.  Business parties incur
costs to cast obligations in written form partly in order to permit a party to stand on its rights when
standing on the contract matters.  Course of performance evidence therefore commonly will be
irrelevant to show what the contract originally meant or what it currently means.  This is because
the parties’ amicable behavior after the contract likely evidences only their view regarding how the
average case should be treated.  Courts, however, see the unusual case that the contract was, in
considerable part, written to govern.94  This example thus illustrates an ambiguity in the principle
that what matters is to ascertain the parties’ intentions.  Parties may have multiple intentions.  Their
actions under the contract often evidence their intentions for typical cases, but seldom evidence
their intentions for the atypical case.  Thus, a court is likely to make a category mistake when it
infers the parties’ preferences regarding how a litigated case should be treated from an evidentiary
base an important part of which is the parties’ behavior in non-litigated cases.95
V. THE LEGAL DEFAULT PROJECT
In Part IV, we argued that sophisticated parties commonly prefer a default theory of
interpretation that instructs courts to use narrow evidentiary bases and to presume that business
96See note 128, infra.
97Parties tend to omit low probability states.  For example, if very low demand is thought quite unlikely,
parties will not incur the contracting cost to specify their obligations in the very low demand state.  A law suit could
arise if this state materializes and the parties cannot agree on a new price.
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contracts are written in the majority language.  Courts can only interpret what is said, so our
analysis assumed that the parties’ writing was complete for the subjects at issue.  Contracts,
however, are often incomplete in relevant respects.  The question we take up here, therefore, is
whether firms would prefer the state to complete these contracts with default legal terms.  The
somewhat surprising answer we derive from contract theory is that most state-created defaults will
be useless or inefficient.  Firms would prefer the state not to create inefficient defaults because
firms will contract out of them; thus, the only effect these defaults will have is to increase
transaction costs.96
Commercial parties commonly will want to condition their obligations on the nature of their
contract partners or on the state of the world that will materialize after the contract is written.  For
example, a seller would like to condition its warranty obligation on the buyer’s intensity of use: the
seller would charge more or warrant less for more intense users because these users are more likely
to make claims.  A buyer also would like to condition price or quantity on the nature of demand ex
post.  If demand turns out to be high, the buyer would be willing to pay more or to take more
product; but the buyer would want a lower price or less product if demand turned out to be low. 
These considerations imply that contracts will inevitably be incomplete.  This is because there are
an infinite number of possible future states and commonly a very large set of possible partner types. 
When the sum of possible states and partner types is infinite and contracting is costly, contracts
must contain gaps.  Parties cannot write contracts about everything.
Incomplete contracts sometimes produce law suits because parties will not always agree ex
post regarding the treatment of omitted contingencies.97  Courts in such cases no longer can do
interpretation because, by definition, the contracts they see contain gaps.  The courts’ task thus
shifts to the development of rules to resolve gap cases.  Hence, some default rules are judicially
98Since these rules are facilitative, courts should permit future parties to vary them.  Judicial creation of
such gap-filling defaults is not inevitable.  A court instead can refuse enforcement when gaps cause a contract to be
obligationally incomplete: that is, when the terms the contract does contain provide an insufficient basis on which to
ground a remedy.   The common law rule is that contracts leaving material terms incomplete or indefinite are not
legally binding.  It may be paradox that the indefiniteness rule is itself a default.  Parties can opt out of it by more
completely specifying their obligations in the contract.
99Restatement defaults differ from statutory defaults because a restatement is not self-executing.  A
restatement provision cannot become a legal default until it is both promulgated by the ALI and then adopted by a
court when resolving a dispute.  Thus, our analysis here applies both to the private legislatures that promulgate
defaults and to the courts that adopt them.
100For analyses of how legal practice innovations spread, see Gerald F. Davis and Henrich R. Greve,
Corporate Elite Networks and Governance Changes in the 1980s, 103 Am. J. Sociology 1 (1997); Gerald F. Davis,
Agents Without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill through the Intercorporate Network, 36 Admin. Sci. Q.
583 (1991).
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created.98  Restatement and statutory drafters also create defaults when, in their view, certain gaps
are likely to recur.  Though our analysis has relevance for courts, we focus here principally on the
Restatement and the UCC, to ask just when the state can create good defaults for business parties.99 
In particular, we derive criteria for efficient defaults, and then argue that these criteria are difficult
for drafters to satisfy.
A. The Case for Defaults
The commonly held view is that but for the cost parties would write complete contracts. 
The state may increase efficiency in cases when contracting costs prevent parties from solving
contracting problems.  To see how, consider the problem of developing a damages rule -- a contract
term specifying the transfer, or the method of computing the transfer, that a party in breach must
pay to its contract partner.  Any particular set of parties would bear the full cost of solving this
problem but likely could not capture the full gain because it can be difficult to prevent later parties
from copying successful solutions that have precipitated into contract terms.100  In this
circumstance, the total social gain from having a rule -- a solution to a contracting problem-- may
exceed the social cost but parties themselves will not create the rule.  There is a case, therefore, for
a publicly supplied contract law that contains efficient solutions to common contracting
101See Charles J. Goetz and Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the
Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 Cal. L. Rev. 261, 291-93 (1985).
102 Id. at 283-86.  The courts’ behavior explains the intensive lobbying by firms regarding the proposed
revisions to Article 2, especially the warranty terms.  See Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2, 63 La. L.
Rev. 1009 (2002).  Firms know that UCC defaults can be sticky in practice.
103If the state wants a particular rule actually to control behavior, it should make the rule mandatory. 
Raising costly but legally surmountable barriers to contracting out arbitrarily disadvantages firms whose gains from
having their own contract are low in relation to contracting costs, yet because many parties do contract out, the
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problems.101
This conclusion implies that contract law rules should be defaults.  This is because parties
are heterogenous in large economies so that not everyone will want the same thing.  Any particular
default rule is itself justified as doing for parties would they would have done for themselves had
their contracting costs been lower.  Hence, parties who will do for themselves -- create their own
solutions -- should be free to do so.  While this conclusion may seem obvious, courts sometimes
create barriers to contracting out of Restatement or UCC rules, on the ground that these rules either
reflect better or fairer solutions than those that parties could develop.102  To the contrary, we will
next argue that commercial parties themselves are the best judges of what constitutes a good
contracting solution, and that default rules should not be chosen on fairness grounds.
A perhaps more precise way to state the ground on which drafters should choose defaults is
that a good default minimizes contracting costs.  Parties, if left free, will supplant or modify state
supplied terms that they dislike.  In a world of free contracting, unpopular defaults thus will raise
contracting costs but not otherwise affect parties’ behavior.  As a consequence, the state’s power is
limited to reducing contracting costs, which it best does by enacting popular defaults. This leaves
open the question what makes a default popular.  This is a difficult question to answer in general
but, as we have seen, firms prefer contract terms that maximize joint surplus.  Good defaults for
firms thus will be popular if they maximize joint surplus and unpopular otherwise.  
It is this result that implies the error of choosing defaults just because they are fair.  Parties
have an incentive, and sometimes the ability, to contract out of even fair defaults that do not
maximize surplus.103  As a good example of this response, commentators and courts once thought
policy behind the rule is not fully realized.
104Part VC below will argue that the UCC’s implied warranty term is inefficient because it provides a seller
with too little guidance regarding the performance obligation and also creates moral hazard.
105Scholars have identified a set of default rules that are termed “information forcing” because the rules
create an incentive for a party to disclose relevant information to its contract partner.  See Ian Ayres and Robert E.
Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L. J. 87 (1989).  The
rules providing that damages cannot be recovered unless they are foreseeable and reasonably certain are information
forcing; they create an incentive for a promisee that fears breach to disclose in advance to the promisor the loss the
promisee would suffer.  The promisor then will be able to price more accurately and to take optimal precautions
against breach.  Information forcing rules fall within the analysis here because parties can create them on their own. 
For example, sellers routinely propose contracts that disclaim liability for consequential damages.  This creates an
incentive for buyers who may suffer these damages to disclose them to the seller and then to purchase insurance –
i.e., the deletion of the disclaimer.  An information forcing default thus will be popular if parties would agree to
disclose in the circumstances to which the rule applies.  It has been shown that the foreseeability default may not
always be popular in this sense.  See Jason S. Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 100 Yale L. J. 615 (1990) (Parties facing a monopolist may not want to disclose the profits they would earn
from successful transactions because the monopolist then may price discriminate against them.)
62
(and may still think) that it is fair for merchant sellers to make implied warranties of quality. 
Merchant sellers, however, routinely attempt to disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability in
UCC §2-314 and their merchant buyers routinely consent.104  The effect of §2-314 in business
contexts thus often is limited to the increasing of transaction costs.  In short, drafters and courts
should ask what parties would like, not what parties should want.105  We argue in the next section
that this is a difficult question to answer.
B. The Cost Concern
1. Default Rules.
A good default rule will condition on few possible states of the world, be relatively simple
in form, and be efficient for a wide variety of contract parties.  The first of these criteria is
necessary because there can be an infinite number of possible future states of the world, but the
state’s drafting costs also are finite.  Thus, it likely would not be cost justified to create a publically
supplied rule if the rule had to contain directions for parties in many possible future states.  The
criterion of simplicity is a function of institutional competence.  While legal rules can be complex,
contract law rules are created by courts and drafters.  Courts cannot conduct investigations into the
efficiency properties of possible rules and rule combinations.  Drafters also have limited resources. 
106See Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 Pa. L. Rev.
595, 607-37 (1995).
107Recall that a rule specifies the relevant conduct in advance – not to drive above fifty five miles per hour.
108Recall that the buyer’s expectation interest would be vs - pk = $80 - $60 = $20.
109See, e.g., Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (King’s Bench, 1863); Restatement of
Contracts (Second) §263.
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The American Law Institute, which creates restatements, and the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, which together with the ALI created the UCC, does not
hold legislative style hearings on proposed rules, cannot hire neutral economic or industry experts
to help in rule creation, and generally rely on the part time labor of law professors and private
attorneys.106  The drafters thus cannot, and do not, write rules for business contexts that match the
tax code’s complexity; rather, contract law necessarily is restricted to the consideration of problems
whose solutions can be embodied in simple rules.
The efficiency criterion is perhaps the most difficult to satisfy because parties in large
economies are heterogeneous.  Default rules would be too expensive to create if efficient solutions
were party specific.  Then there would need to be as many legal rules as there are sets of contracting
parties.  The task, then, is to find rules that would be efficient – surplus maximizing – in a wide
variety of contexts.
There actually are very few default rules107 in contract and commercial law.  In part this is
because drafters recognize, at least implicitly, that the three criteria set out above are very difficult
to satisfy.  We illustrate this point by considering two variants of the investment example analyzed
in Part III.A above.  Assume first that after the parties contracted for the seller to produce the
specialized product, but before the goods were produced, the seller’s factory is destroyed in a fire. 
The seller no longer can produce the goods, but it can pay money damages.108  The common law
default rule nevertheless excuses the seller when an exogenous event makes the contemplated,
specialized performance impossible to render.109  This excuse rule appears to satisfy the criteria for
an efficient default.  First, rule creation costs are low.  There are only two possible future states of
the world: an exogenous event either prevents performance or it does not; and there is need for a
110Section 261 of the Restatement contains the same rule in almost the same language.
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rule in only one of them (when the seller cannot perform).  The rule also is simple in form: the
seller is excused or not, depending on whether there was a fire or not.  Finally, the rule likely is
efficient for a wide variety of parties.  This is because buyers in general are better insurers against
lost valuations of specialized investments than are sellers; buyers usually are better informed than
sellers about the consequences of seller breach.   Excusing the seller requires the buyer either to
insure on the market or to reveal its valuation to the seller.
This example is deceptively simple, however.  The set of possible causes of a seller’s
incapacity to perform can be large, ranging from fire or flood, to a temporary or permanent supply
shortage, to a government regulation, and so on.  A seller’s ability to anticipate and to take
precautions against the causes of incapacity thus will differ across sellers and among causes.  The
law will excuse only when the seller’s inability to perform resulted from causes that were difficult
to anticipate and prevent.  Thus, the excuse doctrine raises difficult causation issues.  The seller also
may be able to perform in part or to perform in full only for some contract buyers.  There is a
question how a seller should make the resultant allocation decisions.  A buyer’s ability itself to take
precautions or to insure efficiently also may differ across buyers.  Drafting rules to cover all of
these possible causes, effects and parties would be quite costly.  As a consequence, the excuse case
today is regulated by a standard, not by a set of rules.  Section 2-615(a) of the UCC provides that a
seller’s failure to perform “is not a breach if performance as agreed has been made impractical by
the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the
contract was made....”110  Courts decide after the fact whether a performance would have been
“impractical” and whether the parties had “basically assumed” that the allegedly excusing cause
would not occur or would not materially affect performance if it did occur.  
To appreciate the second illustration, recall that the investment example implicitly assumed
that the parties’ contract specified what a specialized product would do, so that if the seller
delivered something else breach would be clear.  A default rule also could specify the illustrative
seller’s quality obligation, but recall that the product was assumed to be specialized to the buyer’s
use.  A legal rule that set out the quality obligation the seller was to meet thus would apply to one
111See, e.g., UCC §§2-205, 2-206, 2-207, 2-208, 2-209, 2-302, 2-305, 2-306, 2-307, 2-308, 2-309, 2-311, 2-
312, 2-313, 2-314, 2-315, 2-317, 2-503, 2-504, 2-508, 2-511, 2-513, 2-602, 2-603, 2-604, 2-605, 2-606, 2-607, 2-608,
2-609, 2-610, 2-612, 2-614, 2-615, 2-704, 2-705, 2-706, 2-709, 2-710, 2-712, 2-714, 2-715, 2-716, 2-718, 2-719, 2-
723.  The UCC also adopts standards in order to avoid resolving controversial issues.  See Schwartz and Scott, supra
note 106.  Our analysis here is meant to show that even if the ALI and NCCUSL were bolder, the cost concern would
generate many standards.
112An index clause links the transaction price between the parties to verifiable external indices, such as the
Consumer Price Index, that correlate with the economic conditions facing the parties.  The degree of correlation is a
function of the type of party (some firm’s costs will move more closely with the CPI than other firm’s costs will, for
example) so that index clauses vary with particular parties or party types.
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case.  It is inefficient to draft for one case.  A particular seller’s quality obligation, however,
sometimes can generalize to an industry.  It may be, for example, that book publishers would agree
on what requirements a good printing press must meet.  Even so, the costs to an Article 2 drafter of
describing the quality that sellers in every industry must deliver to every industry buyer would
likely exceed the social gain.  And unsurprisingly, the law also regulates the seller’s quality
obligation with standards.  Under UCC §2-314(2), goods “to be merchantable must be at least such
as (a) pass without objection in the trade ... or (c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such
goods are used....”  Courts after the fact decide whether it was enough for a seller to satisfy
subsection (a) or (c) (“at least such as”); whether the goods would pass without objection; what
“ordinary” seller purposes are; whether the goods “are fit” for such purposes.
Contract and commercial law thus contain very few default rules because parties are
heterogeneous in modern economies, good rules sometimes must be complex, and the efficient rule
may have to take many possible future states of the world or party types into account.  Rather, the
Restatement of Contracts and Article 2 of the UCC primarily contain standards; these texts are
replete with provisions requiring parties to behave “reasonably”, “conscionably”, “fairly”, “in good
faith”, and the like.111  These codifications fail to address important contracting problems.  For
example, parties to long term contracts face the problem of keeping each party’s gain under the
contract above the opportunity cost of performance in every period.  This problem is best addressed
with index clauses, that tie the current period price to current cost and demand conditions.  Efficient
indices are party or industry specific, however, and so are too costly for contract law to create.112 
Instead, the law ignores this long term contracting problem in favor of letting parties solve it for
themselves.  So in sum, the cost concern forces contract law commonly to regulate with standards
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rather than rules, when it regulates at all.
2. Default Standards
The project of creating publicly supplied default standards is difficult to defend.  A publicly
supplied contract law is justified as solving problems for parties that contracting costs prevent
parties from solving on their own.  It is relatively costless for parties to write standards in their
contracts, however.  Thus, for parties to provide that the seller should deliver a “reasonable” quality
level, deliver within a “reasonable” time, but be excused if its performance has become
“impractical”, would exhaust few drafting resources.  When a court observes the absence from a
contract of a standard that would have resolved the issue at bar, then, the court should not infer that
the contract has a gap that typical parties would want the court to fill.  Instead, given how easy it is
for parties to create standards, the best inference commonly will be that a standard is not “missing”
from the contract, but rather its use has been rejected.  The court therefore should not imply a
standard to decide the case.  And for the same reason drafters should be reluctant to enact sets of
seemingly missing standards into statutes or restatements.  To fill nonexistent gaps is to do for
parties what parties do not want done.  
The parties reject standards for two reasons.  First, firms often need specific guidance
regarding the performance obligation.  For example, a seller commonly needs to know what quality
level to produce.  Thus, telling the seller that its product must “at least” satisfy a buyer’s “ordinary
purposes” is generally unhelpful.  In practice, sellers of complex products thus disclaim the implied
warranty of merchantability in favor of making an express warranty that describes important
aspects of the seller’s  performance obligation.  As another illustration, when an exogenous event
induces the seller to consider breaching, both parties need to know whether breach would be legally
permissible.  An erroneous decision could expose one or the other party to a damage judgment. 
Telling the seller at this point, with reference to §2-615, that breach is permissible if performance is
“impractical” also is unhelpful.  And telling the buyer that its return performance (i.e., a payment of
an installment of the price) can be suspended under §2-609 if suspension would be “commercially
reasonable” is similarly useless.  In response to this difficulty, parties commonly ignore the
113An interesting summary of the effect in England of adopting an excuse standard is given by an English
lawyer (Andrew Rogers, QC) in his introduction to a book on the excuse doctrine: “It is only in relatively recent
times that the English courts relented in their demand that the strict words of the contract be adhered to,
notwithstanding changes in circumstances.  The resulting doctrine of frustration of purpose has not worked
satisfactorily.  The courts found it difficult to determine ... the limits for its application.”  “... frustration under the
general law brings in its train automatic discharge.  To avoid such results, the parties to the contract are required to
draft their own particular code.  That in turn means a substantial increase in transaction costs.  Notwithstanding the
costs involved, in an effort to meet the difficulty many contractors have undertaken fairly detailed contractual risk
allocations.”  Force Majeure And Frustration of Contract v-vi (2d Ed. 1995, Ewan McKendrick, Editor).
114See, e.g., T.W. Oil, Inc. v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, 457 N.Y.S. 2d 458, 443 N.E. 2d 932
(1982).
115See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W. D. Pa. 1980).
116See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg, Discretion in Long-Term Open Quantity Contracts: Reining in Good Faith,
35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 319 (2002) for a detailed analysis of the ways in which courts have used the good faith
standard that regulates discretion in output and requirements contracts under §2-306(1) to undermine the controls on
discretion that the parties had set for themselves. 
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standards in §2-615 and §2-609 in favor of writing force majeure and insecurity clauses that specify
precisely the exogenous causes that will excuse the seller’s performance obligation, and specify the
permissible responses that the buyer can take when insecure about the seller’s performance. 
Standards thus are useful only when parties can predict accurately the behaviors that courts will find
sufficient to satisfy a vague descriptor.  This criterion is difficult to meet even for “ancient
standards”, such as those governing excuse, that have generated extensive, and largely inconclusive,
litigation.  Firms thus are unlikely to accept new default legal initiatives that would require them to
behave “reasonably” or “fairly”.113
Standards also increase the likelihood of moral hazard.  When it is unclear what a party must
do, contracting parties have an incentive to interpret ambiguous circumstances in their favor.  Thus,
a buyer has an incentive to claim that a product is unsuitable for one of its “ordinary” purposes
when the market price drops.114  And a seller has an incentive to claim that its performance has
become “impractical” when a rise in input cost makes the contract’s pricing term outmoded; the
seller will argue that neither party “assumed” that a rise of the actual magnitude could occur.115  A
standard is efficient, therefore, only when the party on whom it confers discretion has the incentive
to maximize joint returns in the course of maximizing its private gain.  We think that few UCC
standards could pass this test.116  We know that few UCC standards have been shown to pass this
117The test is not impossible to pass.  For example, the standard merger agreement contains a term
permitting the buyer to exit without penalty if a “material adverse change” occurs in the interim between signing the
contract and concluding the merger.  This term does not specify the events that could constitute a material adverse
change because there can be many such events whose affects will vary with the ex post state of the world.  A
standard nevertheless is efficient here because the buyer will exit only if the seller’s value has fallen materially.  The
threat of exit creates an incentive for the seller to take synergy increasing actions that lower the probability that its
value to the buyer will fall materially.  See Ronald Gilson and Alan Schwartz, Understanding MACs”, Mimeo
(2003).  This example is offered to suggest that some statutory standards may be efficient, but the example also may
support the inference that parties will write a standard in their contracts when a standard would be efficient.
118ALAN SCHWARTZ AND ROBERT E. SCOTT, COMMERCIAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 204-224 (1991).
119Before 1978, parties routinely contracted out of  §2-609 with ipso facto clauses, that stated precisely just
when a party could cancel the agreement in consequence of its partner’s financial difficulty.  The current Bankruptcy
Code outlaws these clauses on the (erroneous) ground that they permit solvent parties to deplete the bankrupt estate. 
For an analysis, see Yeon-Koo Che and Alan Schwartz, Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Inefficient
Continuance, 18 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 441 (1999).  A concrete example of contracting out is in Northwest Lumber
Sales v. Continental Forest Products, Inc., 261 Ore. 480, 492, 495 P.2d 744, 749 (1972).
120Ian Ayres has suggested that standards may be good defaults because precedent can crystalize around
them, thereby providing parties with guidance.  See Ian Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions
of Easterbrook and Fischel, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1391 (1992).  This argument assumes that legal standards will
become operative implied terms in parties’ contracts, thereby giving courts the opportunity to apply them.  The
premise commonly fails, however, because parties contract out of the standards.
121A rare example of a successful default rule is the requirement that a breacher pay the other party the
difference between the contract and market prices.  The rule applies in only one state of the world, when there is
breach; it is simple to apply because the court only compares the contract and market prices; and it is efficient for
many parties because the rule protects the expectation interest.  Other good default rules are hard to find.
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test.117  As evidence for this view, the customary product warranty for machines contracts out of the
quality standard (§2-314); the cure standard (§2-508); and the revocation of acceptance standard
(§2-608)118.  The common force majeure clause contracts out of the excuse standard (§2-615); and
many contracts contract out of the consequential damage standard (§2-715), the warranty damage
standard (§2-714), and the standards governing insecurity and anticipatory repudiation (§§2-609; 2-
610)119.  In the absence of more rigorous evidence, it seems safe to say that contract law’s standards
seldom affect actual contracting behavior.120
In sum, the project of creating default rules founders on the costs of rule creation for
heterogenous parties that function in complex commercial environments.  These costs essentially
preclude the creation of all but a few default rules.121  The project of creating default standards for
parties founders on the need of parties for specific guidance as to what they are supposed to do, and
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on the property of standards to create moral hazard.  These gloomy conclusions hold even when the
information that a rule or standard would require is assumed to be known to the parties and
accessible to the courts.  For example, the parties and a court will know whether a fire destroyed the
seller’s factory in whole or in part.  Information often is asymmetric, however.  Parties may not
know relevant things about each other and courts may not know relevant things about parties.  The
existence of asymmetric information exacerbates the moral hazard concern and thus makes the
creation of efficient defaults even more difficult.
C. The Asymmetric Information Concern
The existence of asymmetric information truncates the set of contracts that parties can write. 
As a consequence, it also truncates the set of defaults that drafters can write.  To see why, it is
helpful to begin with an information taxonomy from the contract theory literature.  A datum of
information is “unobservable” if a party cannot observe it.  Buyers ordinarily cannot observe a
seller’s production cost.  A datum of information is “observable but not verifiable” if a party can
observe it, but cannot verify the information’s existence at an acceptable cost to a third party such
as a court.  For example, an employer usually can know which employees sometimes shirk, but it
would be expensive relative to the gains to prove to a court that a particular employee shirked 20%
of the time.  A datum of information is “verifiable” if a party both can observe it and establish its
existence to a third party.  Information is asymmetric when it is either unobservable or unverifiable. 
To understand the constraints on contracting behavior caused by asymmetric information we
change the relation specific investment example of Part III(B) in two ways.  First, we let the seller’s
costs be stochastic.  In some states of the world, the seller’s cost to produce the specialized product
will be lower than the buyer’s valuation, as in the original example; in other states of the world, the
seller’s costs will exceed the buyer’s valuation, so that trade would be inefficient.  Second, we let
the buyer invest to increase the value of the seller’s performance to it.  These changes generate the
122See Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 Bell J. Econ. 466 (1980); William P.
Rogerson, Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 15 Rand J. Econ. 39 (1984).
123Concise but moderately technical discussions of these contracts are Patrick W. Schmitz, The Hold-Up
Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory, 53 Bulletin of Econ. Research 1
(2001) and Alan Schwartz, Incomplete Contracts in 2 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law 277-
83 (1998).  A nice though also technical example is Benjamin Hermalin and Michael Katz, Judicial Modification of
Contracts Between Sophisticated Parties: A More Complete View of Incomplete Contracts and Their Breach, 9 J. L.,
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well known overinvestment problem.122  The buyer’s damages if the seller breaches will be the
difference between its realized valuation and the price.  The buyer thus will invest until the
marginal cost of further investment will equal the marginal increase in value.  This is too much
because in those states of the world in which it is inefficient for the parties to trade, the buyer’s
investment has no social value; it serves only to increase the damages the seller would pay.
This problem would vanish if the seller could observe the buyer’s production function -- the
functional relation between the possible investment levels the buyer could choose and the values
associated with those levels.  The parties then could write a liquidated damage clause that would
award the buyer the difference between the value the goods would have had were the buyer to
invest optimally and the price.  This value would be lower than the unconstrained value that would
be produced if the buyer never took into account that in some states of the world its investment
would generate no value at all (because the parties will not trade then).  Such a contact seldom can
be written, however, because sellers seldom could observe buyer production functions.  As a
consequence, the buyer would have an incentive to specify as liquidated damages the unconstrained
value of the seller’s performance to it, and then invest to realize that value.  In addition, the court
can observe only what the parties can observe.  Thus, were there no liquidated damage clause, the
court could not award the buyer its valuation had it invested optimally, in lieu of awarding the value
the buyer actually lost, because the court will not know the value that optimal investment would
have generated.  The over-investment problem therefore exists because information is asymmetric.
To be sure, the modified investment example does not show that parties never could induce
efficient investment when information is asymmetric.  The contract theory literature has developed
a number of contracts that, in theory anyway, sometimes would induce the parties to invest when
they should.123  These contracts, however, are “parameter specific”; that is, the prices the contracts
Econ. & Org. 98 (1993).
124Under §2-7152)(a), the buyer can recover (in addition to direct damages under §§2-712, 2-713 or 2-714),
“any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the time of contracting
had reason to know....”
125The prospect of inefficient performances also would induce excessive precautions against breach.
126These clauses disclaim the seller’s liability for consequential damages and restrict the buyer’s right to
reject, but obligate the seller to repair or replace defective tenders.  See SCHWARTZ & SCOTT, supra note 118, at
204-09.
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set depend on the values, costs and probability distributions that particular parties face. 
The lesson is that the state cannot help when asymmetric information prevents parties from
writing the efficient contract.  Parties thus would reject default standards that permitted the seller to
obtain “a commercially reasonable price in proportion to its cost of production”, or that permitted
the buyer to recover “damages in proportion to commercially reasonable reliance investments made
in good faith.”  Under the first proposed standard, the seller always would claim to have high costs;
while under the latter proposed standard, the buyer always would claim that all its investments were
commercially reasonable and were made in good faith.  As another example, the UCC provides in
§2-715 that a seller must either perform or pay the buyer consequential damages measured by the
difference between the contract price and the value of the goods to the buyer.124 This requirement is
superficially efficient because it induces the seller to perform when performance would increase
value and to breach otherwise.  Valuations, however, often are difficult to verify.  As a
consequence, buyers have an incentive to overstate their valuations, thereby inducing sellers to
perform even when the option of breaching and paying true damages would be less costly.125 
Commercial parties respond to this problem by routinely contracting out of §2-715.   In place of the
law, parties create complex repair and replacement provisions that strive for efficiency in other
ways.126  An appreciation of the information problems parties confront compels this conclusion: A
good default does for parties what parties would have done for themselves had their contracting
costs been lower.  When asymmetric information prevents parties from writing certain types of
contracts (even when their contracting costs are zero), a state-supplied default serves no purpose.
127Some Restatement sections embody the (few) simple, binary default rules that have emerged through the
common law process.  Parties have been relatively more receptive to these sections than to the numerous sections
that reflect the efforts of Restatement drafters, following in the UCC tradition, to create additional standards to fill
other perceived contracting gaps.
128This claim may appear vulnerable to the objection that inefficient defaults are “harmless bromides”
because parties are already writing the contract; their marginal cost of avoiding a bad legal rule thus is slight.  This
objection is mistaken on two levels.  First, the total social cost of avoiding an inefficient legal rule is not slight.  The
small cost of changing the rule for a particular contract must be summed over all of the transactions that the rule
affects in the decades that the rule will exist.  Second, it is actually costly to change a bad rule when writing a
particular contract because courts tend to regard state-created defaults as presumptively fair or efficient.  This
institutional bias raises the cost of contracting out.  See, e.g., Hayward v. Postma, 312 Mich. App. 720, 724, 188
N.W. 2d 31,33 (1971) (parties must use clear and unequivocal language to shift liability for risk of loss from seller to
buyer); Caudle v. Sherrard Moters Co., 525 S.W. 2d 238, 240 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (same); Davis v. Small Business
Inv. Co., 535 S.W. 2d 740, 744 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (contractual provision purporting to allocate to debtor the
burden of “all” expenses incurred in preserving collateral not an “agreement otherwise” sufficient to opt out of UCC
§9-207(2)(a)).  Moreover, judicial interpreters may be reluctant to give the express language of the contract a
meaning that conflicts with the relevant default.  See Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772 (9th
Cir. 1981) (merger clause that excludes evidence of prior dealings does not bar evidence of usage of trade to alter the
price term in the contract); Legnos v. United States, 535 F.2d 857, 858 (5th Cir. 1976) (despite express term “F.O.B.
vessel” in contract, international context requires that “the intention of the contracting nations, rather than
definitional niceties, must be given controlling weight). 
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D. Summary
Much of what commonly is called contract law are the sets of default rules and, much more
frequently, default standards contained in the Restatement and UCC Article 2.  We argue here that
the efforts of restatement writers and UCC drafters in creating this law have been largely wasted.127 
Default rules have proved too expensive to write for large heterogeneous economies and default
standards founder over the parties need for ex ante guidance and the property of standards to create
moral hazard.  The moral hazard difficulty is exacerbated by the presence of asymmetric
information.  Defaults that condition on behavior that parties or courts cannot observe would be
exploited for private ends.  Thus, parties contract away from them.  As a consequence, inefficient
defaults only raise transaction costs unnecessarily.128
What then is the proper role of courts in resolving disputes over incomplete contracts?  If a
contract contains a gap, a court sometimes must decide whether to create a standard or to declare
the contract incomplete and thus void for indefiniteness.  It would be appropriate to create a
standard if the standard could satisfy the criteria set out above.  If such a standard does not exist but
the contract has been partly performed, so that declaring it void would create hardship, courts
129The rules prohibiting fraud and duress also function to prevent a party from externalizing costs.  Fraud
and duress do not create social wealth but rather redistribute it (unfairly) between the parties.  Were these practices
permitted, the costs of enforcing the redistributions would be externalized to society.  Thus, not only are fraud and
duress grounds for declining to enforce a contract (because the resulting deal does not maximize joint welfare), but
neither can two parties mutually agree to coerce or defraud each other.
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understandably attempt to read the contract to reach a reasonable result.  It does not follow from
these understandable efforts that drafters should infer default standards from the courts’ holdings. 
Rather, our argument holds that UCC or Restatement drafters commonly should do nothing, and
that courts should be hospitable to attempts by later parties to alter or avoid earlier rules of the case.
We have argued in Part V that firms would reject the “default project” if they could because
the project generates many inefficient terms that contracting parties must incur costs to avoid. 
There is, however, a welfare maximizing role for the state in creating certain default structures. 
While parties often will incur the costs of creating contracts, they almost never will find it cost
justified to create a structure, such as a close corporation law or a bankruptcy act.  Structures that
create default procedures for parties to follow when conducting (or terminating) different forms of
enterprise, and that specify the legal consequence of following these procedures, have created very
large welfare gains.  Substantive contract law, therefore, may simply function on the wrong level of
generality: business parties commonly can create their own contracts, but the state best creates the
broad structures within which to fit the parties’ contracts.  These structures have been largely
unexamined from the perspective of contract theory.
VI. MANDATORY RULES
Mandatory contact law rules ban terms that parties choose; hence, these rules are
inconsistent with the commitment to party sovereignty that we have defended.  The rules
nevertheless are justifiable on two grounds.  The first is to prevent externalities, the classic example
of which is price fixing.129  The second ground is to ameliorate a market failure that disclosure
cannot cure.  As an illustration, consumers are thought to be poorly informed about the odds of
product defects, but it is very difficult to communicate probability information in the format of a
product label.  The law’s response is to ban disclaimers under the doctrine of strict liability in tort.
130Traditional accounts of paternalism require the paternalist – here a judge – to aim at the agent’s welfare. 
For discussion, see Seana V. Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine and Accomodation, 29 Philosophy &
Public Affairs 205 (2000); Richard Arneson, Mill v. Paternalism, 90 Ethics 470 (1981).
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Neither of these traditional grounds can justify the mandatory interpretation rules that we discussed
in Part IV, however.  Terms such as merger clauses and no oral modification provisions affect only
the parties to the contract and there is no market failure to which the rules barring their enforcement
respond.
This suggests that there is a third, largely unremarked, ground for mandatory contract law
rules such as the rules that govern contract interpretation.  To illustrate this claim, recall that today’s
interpretation rules are justifiable if the law’s goal is to discern the parties’ intentions regarding the
contract’s terms, but the rules are not justifiable if the law’s goal is to follow the parties’
preferences regarding judicial interpretive styles.  The third ground for mandatory rules, then, is a
form of paternalism whose logic, in the interpretation context, runs like this:
(A) There are good reasons for courts to enforce the parties’ intentions.
(B) Parties sometimes use contract terms, such as merger clauses or no oral modification 
      clauses, that restrict the ability of courts to find the parties’ intentions.
(C) There is no good reason for the existence of such “intention blocking” terms.
(D) The terms thus are inconsistent with the parties’ true or deep intention, which is to           
       have the court enforce their actual deal; hence, courts should enforce the actual deal.
The interpretation rules are paternalistic because courts override the parties’ expressed preferences
out of a concern with the parties’ welfare.  Courts, that is, do not conceive themselves as imposing
an agreement that parties would reject had they considered the matter under ideal deliberative
conditions.  Rather, courts believe themselves to be supplying the agreement that those conditions
would have produced.130
The difficulty lies with the premise specified in step (C), that parties have no good reason to
write contracts with the suspect terms.  Our discussion in Part IV shows that rational, well informed
131 Restatement (Second) of Contracts §311 comment. A (1979); Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co.,
122 N.E. 2d 378, 387 (N.Y. 1919) (“Those who make a contract can unmake it.  The clause that forbids a change can
be changed like any other ... Whenever two men contract, no limitation self-imposed can destroy their power to
contract again.” Cardozo, J); See also, Zumwinkel v. Legget, 345 S.W. 2d 89 (Mo. 1961); Christine Jolls, supra note
1.  Civil law codes, on the other hand, discourage renegotiation; these codes thus are more consistent with the
argument in text than the common law.  See Eric Brousseau, Did the Common Law Bias the Economics of Contract
... And May it Change? In 6 LAW AND ECONOMICS IN CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES __ (B. Deffains & T. Kirat,
eds. 2001).
132A more extensive formal discussion of the parties’ preferences regarding modifications is in Schwartz &
Watson, supra note 79. 
133See Part III(A), supra.
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and uncoerced parties have good reasons to use the intention blocking contract terms that the Code
disfavors and that many courts do not enforce.  If the premise in (C) is rejected, however, then the
conclusion in (D), that courts are implementing the deep intentions of the parties, must fall as well. 
Paternalism with respect to the interpretation rules thus is misplaced because it frustrates rather than
advances the parties’ welfare: parties choosing under ideal conditions would want what the state
prohibits.  In this Part, we discuss three other contexts in which the rules are mandatory.  In each
case, the rules must be justified on the premise that parties have no good reason to use the terms
that the legal rules prohibit, but in each case that premise fails.  These rules too thus reflect a
misplaced paternalism.
A. Parties Cannot Ban Modifications
Parties are formally free to require modifications to be written but they are not even
formally free to prevent themselves from modifying their contract.131  In the courts’ view, the best
inference from the existence of a modification is that the parties’ original intention to prevent
modifications has become outmoded.  Expressed more fully, parties would not change their minds
regarding the deal’s substance without good reasons, so parties can have had no good reason to
prevent themselves from changing their minds regarding the deal’s substance.  Contracting parties,
however, do have good reasons to freeze the original deal.  We next give an example to show that
modification bans can enable parties to induce efficient relation- specific investment.132  Since a
major reason for enforcing contracts is to encourage relation-specific investment,133 not to enforce a
contractual modification ban is inconsistent with a basic justification for the existence of a contract
76
law itself.
The example involves the production and sale of a product.  The finished product can have
two values for the buyer – high or low – depending on the ex post state of the world and how the
product is made and delivered.  The seller can make a relation specific-investment that would
increase the likelihood that the product will have a high value.  We assume that the parties can
observe the value the product turns out to have, but that values are unverifiable.  Also, the buyer
cannot observe whether the seller made the investment or not.  The parties could, however, write a 
contract that would induce the seller to invest efficiently even in this impoverished information
environment.  The contract has the seller make an up-front payment to the buyer that divides the
expected surplus from the deal; the seller, however, later makes a take it or leave it offer to the
buyer that requires the buyer to pay a price equal to the realized value of the product ex post.
To see how this contract would work, we assume that if the seller invests, at a cost of c > 0,
the product will have a high value for the buyer with probability .8.  If the seller does not invest, its
cost is zero but the product will have a low value with certainty. After the seller invests (or not), it
produces the product.  We normalize the production cost to zero, so that it always is efficient for the
parties to trade.  In the example, a high value is $40 and a low value is $20.  It would be efficient
for the seller to invest if the expected gain less the cost would exceed the low value: i.e., if .8($40)
+ .2($20) - c $ $20, or if c is $16 or less.  We let c = $12 so that investment would be efficient. 
Recalling that the buyer must pay $40 if the value is $40 and $20 if the value is $20, the seller
expects to earn .8($40) + .2($20) - $12 = $24.  Suppose for convenience that the parties share the
surplus the contract creates.  On these assumptions, the buyer will accept the contract if the seller
makes an up-front payment of half the expected surplus, or $12, and the seller will accept the
contract, and invest, because its expected gain also is $12.
The difficulty is that the buyer will reject the take it or leave it offer, and this will defeat the
contractual solution.  Just as in the example in Part III.(B), the seller’s investment cost is sunk. 
Thus, after the take it or leave it offer is rejected, the parties will agree to renegotiate the price.  If
the realized value is $40, the buyer thus will offer $20, which the seller will take; and if the realized
134Recall that the seller cannot sue for the price because values are unverifiable.
135The investment in this example is termed “cooperative” because the seller invests to increase the buyer’s
value.  When renegotiation is permitted, cooperative investment can be impossible to motivate by contract.  See
Yeon-Koo Che and Donald Hausch, Cooperative Investment and the Value of Contracting: Coase v. Williamson, 89
Amer. Econ. Rev. 125 (1999).  Irit Segal, Complexity and Renegotiation: A Foundation for Incomplete Contracts, 66
Rev. Econ. Stud. 57 (1999).  Our earlier examples involved self investment (the seller invests to lower her costs; the
buyer invests to increase his value).  Efficient self investment is easier to motivate with appropriate contracts.  Both
kinds of investment are common.
136Bans on modification also can be efficient when one of the parties is risk averse.  To see why, consider a
possible contract between a risk neutral principal and a risk averse agent who is supposed to do a task.  The principal,
it is commonly assumed, cannot verify the agent’s behavior to a court so the contract must motivate the agent.  This
will require the agent to bear risk; that is, her pay must be contingent on the outcome so she will try to produce a
good result.  The agent bears risk because the outcome is a function both of her efforts, which increase the likelihood
of a good result, and chance.  After the agent acts, but before the result is known, a pareto improving deal between
the parties becomes possible. Since the agent has acted, she no longer needs to be motivated but she still bears risk
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value is $20, the product will change hands for a price of $10.134  To see how renegotiation defeats
the contract,  realize that if the seller does not invest, the product will be worth $20 with certainty
and the seller’s payoff would be $10.  Given renegotiation, the seller’s expected gain if it invests is
.8($20) + .2($10) - $12 = $6.  Hence, the seller will not invest though investment would have been
efficient.  Perhaps a more vivid way to put this result is that when renegotiation is a possible
outcome, our illustrative parties would do as well without a contract as with one.  If there were no
contract, the seller would decline to invest; instead, it would offer the finished low value product to
the buyer for $10 in a spot transaction.  But this is exactly the payoff a non-investing seller would
expect to receive under the contract, given renegotiation, so it would be pointless for the parties to
contract.135 
The lesson is that parties sometimes cannot write contracts that will induce efficient
relation-specific investment because renegotiation – a contract modification – cannot be banned. 
An enforceable ban on modifications would permit the seller to reinstate the contract’s original
price term.  As applied to this case, if the buyer paid $20 a court could later order the buyer to pay
another $20 because it can observe both the written contract and any monetary transfers the parties
make.  And if the buyer refused to pay anything, the seller would deliver nothing and sue to recover
the $12 it paid up front.  The buyer’s payoff thus is positive if it complies with the contract and zero
if it does not, so it can be expected to comply and the seller will invest.  In short, parties can have
good reasons for banning modifications.136
because nature has yet to act. The deal will transfer risk from her to the risk neutral principal by paying the agent a
fixed fee that will lie somewhere between the contract’s good and bad state payoffs to her.  If the parties anticipate
this renegotiation, however, they will know that the agent’s payoff will not be a function of the outcome; rather, it
will be the fixed fee the agent expects to get in the renegotiation.  Thus, the agent cannot be motivated to try hard
because her payoff actually is noncontingent.  When trying hard is efficient, permitting renegotiation thus is
inefficient.  The parties, ex ante, again have good reasons to prevent themselves from changing their minds.
137If the performance is substantial, the default rule is that the promisor must transfer the price less a sum
that would compensate it for the deviation from full performance.  Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§237 and
241.  As we will see below, when the promisor’s valuation is not verifiable the right to deduct damages is hollow.
138See Restatement (Second) of Contracts) §227, comment b: “The policy of the law requires that, within
broad limits ..., the agreement of the parties should be honored even though forfeiture results.  When, however, it is
doubtful whether or not the agreement makes an event a condition of the obligor’s duty, an interpretation is preferred
that will reduce the risk of forfeiture.”  See also, SCOTT & KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY,supra note
__, at 718-21.
139230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921).
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B. Parties Must Accept Substantial Performance
Courts will generally require parties to accept substantial rather than full performance
unless, in the court’s view, the deviation is material.137  Parties sometimes try to opt out of this
substantial performance default by making full performance an express condition of the promisee’s
duty to pay.  Courts, however, frequently refuse to require exact compliance with the express
condition on the ground that “the law abhors a forfeiture.”138  The basic premise is that the
performing party would not agree to a contract that would penalize it severely for minor deviations. 
Since the paying party would know this, neither party would think that the contract required the
equivalent of a forfeiture for a slight nonconformity, in spite of what the written words appear to
say.  The parties, courts believe, have no good reason to require forfeitures; and thus courts strictly
construe express conditions that require full performance.
We offer an example, drawn from the famous case of Jacob & Youngs v. Kent139, to show
that parties have good reasons to construct deals that make forfeitures possible.  Consider a contract
that requires an owner to make progress payments to a builder as construction progresses.  The last
payment, which is sizable, is due when construction is completed.  We assume that values are
unverifiable.  Thus, a court cannot observe the value of a building completed in accordance with the
contract to the owner.  On this assumption, there can be moral hazard on both sides.  If the builder
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has the burden of proof, the owner may claim that defects in the final version reduce her value
substantially though they do not.  The unverifiability of valuations would make it difficult for the
builder to disprove this claim.  Conversely, if the owner has the burden of proof, the builder may
deliberately render a defective performance but claim that, in fact, it had substantially complied.  
To understand the potential effect of such moral hazard, assume that the builder has the
burden of proof and the owner will cheat by withholding the entire final payment if the building is
less than perfect.  Since perfection is difficult to achieve, the builder will expect not to receive the
final payment.  Therefore, it will not render the final performance.  But then the owner will know
that the contract’s penultimate performance will be the final one, and it will cheat then.  The
builder, anticipating this, will not render the penultimate performance.  In equilibrium, therefore,
the builder will render no performance at all. The parties’ contracting problem thus is to induce the
builder to perform when the unverifiability of values makes strategic behavior likely.
The parties’ solution follows from the contextual nature of verifiability.  A datum of
information may not be verifiable to a court because explaining matters to a generalist judge or a
lay jury can be costly in relation to the gains.  The same datum of information may be verifiable to
an arbitrator, however.  The arbitrator’s expertise makes her cheaper to inform; she acts in an
informal setting; and she has a reputational stake in not appearing to be biased in favor of builders
or owners. To ensure that parties cooperate with the arbitrator, the parties will make her decision
conclusive in the absence of fraud, bias or mistake.  
In the actual case, the parties had adopted this common solution to the moral hazard
problem, making an architect the arbitrator.  The architect refused to certify that the builder had
fully complied, though the defect appeared trivial.  The seeming disjunct between the size of the
withheld final payment and the nature of the noncompliance suggested possible fraud or mistake by
the architect.  The builder, however, did not attempt to impeach the architect’s decision.  Rather, the
builder asked a court to hold that perfect compliance was not a condition to receiving the entire last
payment, and the court agreed.  It believed both that forfeiture of the entire last payment would
have been unfair, and that the parties could not have intended this result.  The issue the case posed,
140See UCC §2-718(1) (“Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only at
an amount which is reasonable in the light of anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach .... A term fixing
unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.”)
141See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation
Principle: Some Notes on a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 Colum. L. Rev. 554 (1977).
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however, was not whether the parties had or lacked good reasons to permit forfeitures.  Instead, the
issue was whether the parties had good reasons to make the architect’s findings conclusive. 
Requiring a promisee to accept substantial performance of a construction contract when the parties
had adopted a sophisticated governance scheme on the ground that the parties lacked good reasons
to require a perfect tender thus is mistaken paternalism.
C. Parties Cannot Agree to Penalties
Contracting parties are permitted to specify the damages the breaching promisor must pay,
provided that the specified damages represent a reasonable estimate of the promisee’s lost
expectation.140  Parties, however, are not permitted to specify damages that exceed a reasonable
estimate of the promisee’s expectation.  The logic here is the same as in the above examples.  The
parties made the contract in order to give the promisee a particular performance for a price.  They
know that breaches sometimes occur, so the parties also have good reasons to ensure that the
promisee will receive a monetary substitute for performance in the event of breach.  But contracting
parties do not have good reasons to award the promisee much more than its lost expectation when
the promisor fails to perform.  The parties’ deep contractual goal is advanced, therefore, by a
mandatory rule declaring penalty clauses unenforceable.  
This premise fails for two reasons.  First, courts will sometimes implement the penalty rule
inaccurately.  Courts regulate liquidated damage clauses by comparing the difference between
anticipated damages under the expectation damages default rule to the stipulated damages in the
contract.  Expectation damages, in turn, are based on the verifiable losses that the promisee
anticipates from breach.  Any liquidated damage clause that incorporates observable but
nonverifiable values thus will be vulnerable to a penalty claim even when the clause accurately
measures the promisee’s lost expectation.141  Moreover, courts sometimes find compensatory
142See Alan Schwartz, The Myth that Promisee’s Prefer SupraCompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of
Contracting  for Damage Measures, 100 Yale L. J. 376 (1990).
143See Aaron Edlin and Alan Schwartz, Optimal Penalties in Contracts, 78 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 101
(2002).  When the seller has market power, parties may use penalties to deter the entry of competitors into the
seller’s market.  See id.  Under current law, however, courts strike what they perceive to be penalty terms whether
those terms were used to increase investment or to impede entry.  We argue here that it is only a misplaced
paternalism that inclines courts not to restrict themselves to the banning only of inefficient penalties.  Another way to
put this claim is that a party should always be free to argue that any term would create a negative externality or
perpetuate a market failure.  But it is a mistake to treat as a sufficient proxy for these inefficiencies a liquidated
damage clause that would overcompensate the promisee in expectation.
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liquidated damage clauses to be penalties in complex cases because the courts have failed to
understand just how the clause protected the promisee’s expectation.142 These difficulties with
current law permit promisors to invoke the penalty doctrine strategically.  As a consequence,
sophisticated parties are discouraged from using liquidated damage clauses when these clauses
would otherwise be optimal.
The second reason why current law should change is directly relevant to the argument
advanced above.  The premise that parties have no good reason to contract for penalties is itself
mistaken.  Rather, penalties can permit parties to induce efficient relation-specific investments in
certain asymmetric information environments. Commercial parties thus have good reasons to agree
to penalties in these circumstances.  Banning a liquidated damage clause because, and only because,
it requires the breaching promisor to make a transfer that exceeds the promisee’s expectation thus
wrongly interferes with the parties’ sovereignty.143 
To summarize, contract law contains a number of mandatory rules that apply in the absence
of an externality or a market failure.  These rules override contractual terms that appear to be
inconsistent with the intentions that rational, informed and uncoerced parties would have in the
circumstances.  It appears to courts and the drafters of the UCC that actual parties have no good
reasons for choosing these terms.  A defensible paternalism thus would not enforce them.  In the
cases we have analyzed, however, commercial parties turn out to have good reasons for the things
they do.  Put another way, the contract terms that courts and the UCC refuse to enforce actually
advance the parties’ welfare.  A paternalist justification for contract law’s mandatory rules therefore
fails, a result that should not be surprising.  In Part II, we showed that commercial parties pursue a
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goal -- joint welfare maximization – that the state supports, and generally can choose the means that
best implement this goal.  The rules regulating contracts between business firms thus should be
mandatory only when the parties’ contract creates an externality or is the product of market failure.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article does not ask the conventional normative question: What contract law should the
state provide.  Rather, it asks what contract law do business firms want the state to provide?   A
contract law for firms, we answer, would be smaller and more deferential to contracting parties than
the contract law we now have.  Of first order importance, firms want the state to enforce the
contracts that they write, not the contracts that a decision maker with a concern for fairness would
prefer them to have written.  Enforcement of written agreements presupposes a theory of
interpretation.  The commitment to party sovereignty that we defend in this Article requires courts
to delegate to parties both the choice of a contract’s substantive terms and the choice of the
interpretive theory that will be used to enforce those terms.  Commercial parties, we show,
commonly prefer adjudicators to be accurate on average in ascertaining the meaning of their
agreements rather than accurate in every instance; therefore, these parties want courts to make
interpretations on the smallest evidentiary bases that will support on average accurate
interpretations.  Courts that defer to party preferences regarding interpretation thus will use a
textualist interpretive style, one that restricts the evidentiary base to not much more than the written
agreement.  Moreover, most firms prefer courts to interpret their contracts with the presumption that
the contract is written in what we call majority talk, the language that firms and courts usually
speak.  For this reason, too, a textualist interpretive theory is the best default.
Much of today’s contract law is in the form of default rules and standards.  These defaults
cause more harm than good.  An efficient default rule – one firms will accept – is simple in form,
conditions on few states of the world and maximizes joint gains in a wide variety of contexts.  A
default standard is efficient only when parties can live with vague definitions of their contracting
obligations.  Because standards confer considerable discretion on parties, a standard will be
unsatisfactory if, as a result of that discretion, parties are likely to behave strategically under it.  As
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we show, parties are heterogeneous, drafting costs are finite even for public decisionmakers, rules
must sometimes be complex, parties commonly will exploit standards to redistribute rather than to
maximize joint surplus, and information often is asymmetric.  All of these factors create obstacles
to the creation of efficient default rules and standards that the state seldom has been able to
overcome.  Unsurprisingly, business parties often contract out of the current failed attempts.  The
effective domain of state supplied contract law thus is necessarily smaller than is widely believed.
The welfare maximization goal that we advance justifies courts in refusing enforcement to
unconscionable contracts, contracts affected by fraud or duress and contracts that create
externalities.  This goal, however, cannot support many of the mandatory rules that today govern
much contracting behavior between firms.  Those rules bar enforcement to contract terms that
efficiently cope with problems of hidden information and hidden action.
A normative theory of contract law that takes party sovereignty seriously shows that much
of the expansion of contract law over the last fifty years has been ill advised.  Contract law today is
composed of a few default rules, many default standards and a number of mandatory rules.  The
mandatory rules should at most be defaults and most of the defaults should vanish from the law. 
Advocating freedom of contract for firms is uncontroversial.  Taking freedom of contract seriously,
however, would radically truncate current contract law.  A law merchant appropriate to our time
would be a merchants’ law; and for merchants the less publically supplied law the better.
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